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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Date of entry 11/09/2017

On Monday, 18 September 2017 and Tuesday, 19 September 2017, CHRISTOPHER STEELE, ORBIS Business Intelligence, was interviewed at The Grosvenor Hotel, London, England, by FBI SSA [REDACTED] and FBI SIA Brian J. Auten. The following information was provided by STEELE over the course of the two-day interview. On 18 September 2017, in the initial part of the interview, STEELE was accompanied by his fellow ORBIS executive, CHRISTOPHER BURROWS. After about 45-60 minutes on 18 September 2017, BURROWS departed, and STEELE remained with SSA [REDACTED] and SIA Auten for the duration of 18 September 2017 and for the entirety of the interview on 19 September 2017.

On 18 September 2017, BURROWS opened the interview by expressing concern over loose business ends with the FBI. BURROWS explained that he and STEELE were still pretty upset about how the relationship with the FBI concluded because of the time and effort that had been taken to get information to the FBI. BURROWS explained that we had a contract with [REDACTED] adding that maybe the contract had been put together with STEELE serving as the "face" of ORBIS, but that there had been a contractual relationship.

STEELE and BURROWS apologized for going to the press back in the fall of 2016, but STEELE explained that as the election season went on, they as the company were "riding two horses" - their client and the FBI -- and after FBI Director James COMEY's reopening of the Hillary Clinton investigation, they had to pick "one horse" and chose the business/client relationship over the relationship with the FBI. They followed what their client wanted, and they spoke to the press. STEELE and BURROWS described the overall situation as being one where it was "your [FBI] fault" and "our fault." STEELE commented that it was not about the money owed, but BURROWS remarked that STEELE might not be that concerned about the money, but BURROWS was.

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Investigation on 09/18/2017 at London, United Kingdom (In Person)

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372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 2 of 26

STEELE and BURROWS were confused over whether SSA [REDACTED] and SIA Auten represented the FBI or the Office of the Special Counsel. BURROWS made the point, in his former career, he "knew [Robert] Mueller." They wanted to make sure that they were talking to the Office of the Special Counsel.

STEELE and BURROWS indicated frustration by the inclusion of their company's reporting in the United States (US) Intelligence Community's Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) of Russia interference in the 2016 election, particularly the ICA "annex" as reported in the media. STEELE and BURROWS felt that they should have had advance warning that the company's reporting was going to be used in the annex. The inclusion of the company's information and the subsequent public leak of the annex put STEELE's name out there and had a "massive impact on our lives." STEELE and BURROWS wanted to know how the US and [REDACTED] FGI governments had worked all of this out, and also wanted to know if the [REDACTED] FGI was told that the information was going in the ICA.

STEELE and BURROWS described President TRUMP as their "main opponent" and indicated that they were fearful about how TRUMP's presidency negatively impacted the historical UK-US alliance and the US-UK special relationship.

STEELE said that GLENN SIMPSON of Fusion GPS was knowledgeable that STEELE was sharing reports and information with the FBI.

STEELE explained that, in the run-up to the 2016 US presidential election, they provided material to BRUCE OHR and were pushing OHR to do something about the reports.

STEELE said that he had been unsure to whom, [REDACTED] FGI he could provide the election-related reports. He decided against going to his primary [REDACTED] FGI, who he did not identify by name to interviewers, but described as having just converted to become the [REDACTED] FGI [REDACTED]

STEELE said that his primary subsorce for the election reports - who he would not identify by name for the entirety of the interview - had also provided information used in earlier, non-election related reporting provided to the FBI.

STEELE's primary subsorce met with Sergey MILLIAN. The primary subsorce had shared a photo with STEELE depicting MILLIAN with TRUMP. STEELE tried to have his primary subsorce record a meeting between the primary subsorce and Millian, but it was not successful. MILLIAN was allegedly at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2013. MILLIAN has lost contact with STEELE's primary subsorce. STEELE said that MILLIAN is the [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]  
372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 3 of 26

individual who originally provided the primary subsource with the Ritz Carlton-related information about TRUMP. STEELE's primary subsource followed up MILLIAN's information with three people. ORBIS has the names of the three people with whom the primary subsource followed up.

STEELE said that his primary subsource had drinks with CHARLES DOLAN.

STEELE said that he had never heard of CARTER PAGE or MICHAEL COHEN or GEORGE PAPADOUPOLOS before this whole thing. He had heard of PAUL MANAFORT which STEELE said got the whole thing started. He had heard of REX TILLERSON before this, and told interviewers that he would describe this in greater detail later in the interview.

When asked by interviewers about his vetting and validation of his primary subsource, STEELE said that he knew the primary subsource's background and the current positions of his primary subsource's sub-sources. STEELE said that his primary subsource's reporting was consistent over multiple projects, which STEELE used as a vetting and validation point of reference. STEELE also confirmed his primary subsource's reporting through other sources.

STEELE said that ORBIS has four discrete, "hermetically-sealed" main agent networks. The biggest of these was the network involved with his primary subsource, which isn't as active now. For one of the older networks, the main agent had died. Another main agent network is up and running and is now starting to get good information. It is based on a new main agent - not the primary subsource for the election reports - and it is being redirected to collect on Russia. STEELE also said that he has a source looking at the Sunny Isles real estate purchase by RYBOLOVLEV. This particular source is someone in public relations/government relations (PR/GR) circles.

STEELE said that his primary subsource feels like it is about time to engage with the Office of the Special Counsel. STEELE spoke with his primary subsource last night, and the primary subsource is coming along with the idea of talking with Special Counsel, but was not there yet. STEELE is still very concerned to protect his primary subsource. The primary subsource has a very special story, especially how he came to work for ORBIS. The primary subsource was introduced to STEELE and ORBIS by FIONA HILL in or around 2011. The primary subsource was with HILL when HILL was at the Brookings Institution. Emphasizing the sensitivity, STEELE explained that HILL now worked for the White House on the National Security Council. HILL has a very high opinion of the primary subsource, and she told STEELE that he and ORBIS should take a look at him. HILL is one of STEELE's close friends - STEELE later described in the interview

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 4 of 26

that his wife went to university with HILL, and that HILL's daughter is named after a now-deceased mutual college friend of HILL and his wife.

STEELE said that his primary subsource is a US resident and is a native Russian, adding that there was no way he could have the kind of access he has without being Russian. STEELE added that someone who was Ukrainian could possibly have the type of access his source has. STEELE's primary subsource has a daughter who was born in the United States.

STEELE trained up his primary subsource, and STEELE described him as a prolific asset. The primary subsource's motivations include the fact that he considers the United States to be his home, the fact that his daughter is US-born, and finances. The primary subsource uses his prior university contacts, and his reporting has become better over time. STEELE was asked by interviewers if his primary subsource had anything happen to him while collecting for ORBIS. STEELE indicated that his primary subsource had reported being hauled in front of immigration authorities in Russia. The primary subsource was shaken down for money - he was forced to go to an ATM and withdraw money and paid the bribe. STEELE took this as a good sign for validation purposes, remarking that things haven't gone smoothly for his primary subsource all the time.

STEELE said that his primary subsource took three trips to Russia in 2016 for collecting information for the election-related ORBIS reports. STEELE said that he was working on memory for some of this, as ORBIS destroyed materials for legal reasons. STEELE said that his primary subsource took trips in June, October and one in between. STEELE would debrief his primary subsource after these trips. STEELE also said that STEELE took three trips himself to the United States in 2016 and talked with his primary subsource. STEELE dated his US trips as occurring in July, early-to-mid September, and October - after STEELE had met with FBI representatives in Rome.

STEELE said that his primary subsource uses [REDACTED] to communicate like [REDACTED]. There was a push to get an audio capture of primary subsource's conversations with one of his own sub-sources, and they were successful in obtaining audio of a conversation between the primary subsource and his sub-subsource regarding MICHAEL COHEN's meeting in Prague. STEELE told interviewers that he did not have that audio capture in its original form. STEELE explained that he had to be careful regarding legal issues, but they had audio capture and a transcription of the audio capture. There may be an opportunity to obtain more on this because this particular sub-subsource [REDACTED] and in an accessible place. STEELE's primary subsource is having dialogue with that particular subsource, and that individual may be thinking of "coming in."

[REDACTED]



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372B-SM-2063661

Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

On 09/18/2017, Page 5 of 26

STEELE described this particular sub-subsource in greater detail. [REDACTED] part of a pool of journalists and staffers, traveling with Russian leadership in shared planes and hanging out in offices - akin to participation in a White House press pool. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] individual who reported in election-related reports on IVANOV and COHEN's visit to Prague. On the Prague-related reporting, STEELE said that [REDACTED] knew someone in Prague who worked for ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO. [REDACTED] also knows people in the cyber business. Allegedly, ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO was the crucible for the COHEN meeting in Prague [REDACTED]

STEELE said that another, different sub-subsource had provided information on cyber. This particular sub-subsource talked about how the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) was able to turn an individual who had been caught money laundering and get him/her to work cyber operations for the FSB. STEELE commented about how this is a typical operating procedure for the FSB.

In reference to a question posed by interviewers about the primary subsource's reporting on St. Petersburg, STEELE said that his primary subsource had traveled to St. Petersburg. The primary subsource has an apartment in St. Petersburg that he is trying to sell. The primary subsource is neither from Moscow nor St. Petersburg, but the property gives him reason to travel to St. Petersburg. STEELE could not recall exactly which of his primary subsource's 2016 trips to Russia involved a trip to St. Petersburg, but it may have been on the third one.

STEELE said that the primary subsource's third trip involved him being asked, as an expert, to attend events at the Kremlin. The primary subsource gave a talk or a seminar at the event; he was a contributor, which gave him cover for being there. The third trip occurred at the time that STEELE was meeting with FBI representatives in Rome. This was why STEELE couldn't contact the primary subsource during that time - the primary subsource had said not to contact him because he'd be at the Kremlin. This is the event, STEELE added, during which time the primary subsource collected information about EDWARD SNOWDEN and also a senior FSB officer.

STEELE explained that, when collecting information for ORBIS, his primary subsource plays up his overt, academic interests. It is an "in-between" clandestine and overt cover. The primary subsource does favors for people.

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372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 6 of 26

In fact, STEELE explained that STEELE had helped to recommend the best English language school for one of his primary subsource's sub-sources.

With respect to the election-related reports, STEELE said that it did not take much effort early-on for his primary subsource to collect information because the whole thing was an "open secret" in Moscow. People would start talking in bars, and the primary subsource could easily elicit information. Later, as 2016 progressed, sources of information started shutting down and it became harder to obtain information.

STEELE said that the primary subsource has sub-sources with serious access to named people in DMITRIY PESKOV's and SERGEY IVANOV's tight circles.

According to STEELE, the primary subsource has traveled to Volgograd as part of research for ORBIS on a litigation/legal matter. The primary subsource has contacts in different cities - for example, the primary subsource is close to, or has sub-sources close to, YURIY TRUTNEV, Minister of Resources. STEELE commented that his primary subsource has collected information for many of ORBIS' litigation clients in the energy and mining sectors. The primary subsource has been going back and forth to different cities for years for ORBIS' litigation clients. For the election-related reports, the primary subsource had about three trips to Russia in about 4 months.

STEELE explained that ORBIS' initial interest in the US election-related material stemmed from a litigation-related issue. It involved potential litigation with PAUL MANAFORT, and ORBIS' interest started around May 2016. MANAFORT had disappeared for multiple years and appeared to be hiding from creditors. MANAFORT owed money -- \$100 million to oligarchs and more money to Russians (NFI). STEELE explained that FUSION GPS had a different client for whom it was already doing research on MANAFORT. Around June 2016, STEELE met with FUSION GPS and they decided to start swapping notes. Soon thereafter, the decision was made to have FUSION GPS hire ORBIS on the election-related stuff - FUSION GPS would "take [ORBIS] on for the bigger issue." In June 2016, ORBIS took its own crack at the election-related stuff. STEELE said that it wasn't the only politically-sensitive investigation ORBIS was working at the time. For example, ORBIS was handling an English Football Association (FA) matter regarding a competitor for the bid process. STEELE also said - and emphasized the extreme sensitivity of this example -- ORBIS was also involved in doing work regarding the election campaign for the UN Secretary General post - a client wanted them to work up material on possible voting intentions.



372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] STEELE, On 09/18/2017, Page 7 of 26

In June 2016, ORBIS got election-related reporting from the primary subsource, as well as from a different subsource. In early July, STEELE indicated that they got a debriefing about RYBOLOVLEV and the sale of property in Florida. STEELE remembered that the material on RYBOLOVLEV was received before STEELE took a holiday trip to Cyprus.

STEELE said that his primary subsource did a bit of work in the United States on election-related collecting. In the United States, the primary subsource talked to SERGEY MILLIAN and one or two others. Regarding MILLIAN, STEELE said that the primary subsource was introduced to MILLIAN through "some émigré" in Washington, DC. MILLIAN and the primary subsource met in New York and perhaps in Charleston, South Carolina. The primary subsource had two or three meetings with MILLIAN. The primary subsource and MILLIAN discussed a possible business project. The business project wasn't notional - it dealt with some sort of warehouse in Moscow. STEELE recalled seeing some documentation about this business project. STEELE described it as a pretty standard Russian type of thing dealing with land registration or land documentation. STEELE emphasized that it was a pretty typical Russian business endeavor.

STEELE described his primary subsource's sub-subsource networks. While doing this, STEELE drew a diagram for interviewers. See attached.

On reporting regarding CARTER PAGE, STEELE said that it stemmed from Page's speech in Moscow in July 2016. The reporting about PAGE's meetings with IGOR SECHIN and IGOR DIVEYKIN all came from the same sub-subsource - [REDACTED]

On reporting about OLEG GOVORUN, STEELE identified this stream of reporting as stemming from a different sub-subsource --- [REDACTED]

On reporting involving DMITRIY PESKOV's office, this reporting stems from a "friend of a friend" of the primary subsource. Later, STEELE gave the identity of this individual as [REDACTED].

On reporting about Prague and ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO, STEELE said that [REDACTED]

STEELE talked in more detail about his decision to talk to the press. STEELE said that after COMEY's letter reopening the HILLARY CLINTON investigation, FUSION GPS felt like the gloves had come off. STEELE said that he had previous discussions earlier with BRUCE OHR about getting the [REDACTED]

372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] STEELE, On 09/18/2017, Page 8 of 26

election-related material out, but OHR had explained to STEELE about US Department of Justice policy about needing to be hands-off prior to elections. FUSION GPS put pressure on ORBIS to talk to Mother Jones. STEELE initially said that his interview with Mother Jones was supposed to have been off-the-record, but then he added that the interview was a combination of off-the-record and on-the-record. STEELE said that, in the end, he should not have given the interview. STEELE said that, subsequently, with the rift that the interview had caused with the FBI, they had no way of getting this information into the hands of people who they believed needed it. That is when they decided to go the route of Senator JOHN MCCAIN and DAVID KRAMER. In the end, however, STEELE believes that the decision to go the MCCAIN and KRAMER route is how Buzzfeed got the material and is why, now, STEELE has the legal problems he has.

BRUCE OHR is aware that STEELE is currently in touch with the FBI. OHR knows about this meeting. STEELE said that he has reached out to OHR and GLENN SIMPSON about the primary subsource.

STEELE believes that his primary subsource is coming around to the idea of meeting with the Office of the Special Counsel. STEELE only wants that to happen if the primary subsource agrees to it. It needs to be carefully handled. For instance, STEELE said that the primary subsource's parents are still in Russia.

STEELE said that the primary subsource has been doing a bit of work for ORBIS recently. He has been reaching out to some of the same sub-sources. ORBIS has had an interest in the "prophylactic efforts" by the Russian government following the publicity of the dossier.

When asked what type of tradecraft STEELE's primary subsource has used when collecting information for ORBIS, STEELE said that his primary subsource uses [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The primary subsource takes very few written notes. The primary subsource is very thorough when it comes to preparing himself to be debriefed; he takes time before being debriefed to get his thoughts and recollections together. STEELE said that the primary subsource uses [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The primary subsource has used this approach in the past - STEELE mentioned trips that the primary subsource has taken to Samara and Volgograd on behalf of ORBIS' due diligence and legal work, including for clients in the potassium industry. The primary subsource has a very good memory.

STEELE said that only four or five people in ORBIS' office have dealt with the primary subsource. The primary subsource was debriefed the first time [REDACTED]



372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 9 of 26

in the office, but not after that. STEELE said that ORBIS is now very concerned about bugging, so they wouldn't debrief sources in their office.

STEELE has had substantive debriefings with the primary subsource. STEELE explained that the primary subsource was not just working on election-related collection during the primary subsource's 2016 trips to Russia. He was working on multiple projects at the same time. That said, STEELE indicated that the primary subsource definitely collected on election-related materials during his three trips to Russia in 2016.

STEELE said that the primary subsource is currently working through obtaining US work permits and residence permits. The primary subsource hasn't been back to Russia since his 2016 trips.

STEELE said that he is close enough to the primary subsource that the primary subsource would have told him that he'd been interviewed (NFI).

STEELE said FIONA HILL knows that the primary subsource was involved in the dossier. When the primary subsource went to ground in January and February 2017, STEELE contacted HILL and told HILL that he was worried about the primary subsource. STEELE said that she probably guesses that the primary subsource was involved. STEELE remembered seeing HILL in the UK in early 2016, while STEELE's wife was abroad. HILL was still at Brookings. STEELE does not recall the last time he saw HILL.

STEELE said that the primary subsource has a journalist contact in Washington, DC who is the primary subsource's entry into the émigré community.

When asked about STEELE's own validation and/or assessment of hostile control for the primary subsource, STEELE mentioned a number of things which he took to be positive signs. First, there was the incident involving the primary subsource being shaken down for money. Second, the primary subsource exhibits behavior indicative of someone who is scared - the primary subsource would not be talking about coming to the talk to the Special Counsel if there was a problem. STEELE does not believe that the primary subsource exhibits signs or behavior of someone who is under control. STEELE cannot guarantee that the primary subsource's sub-sources aren't under control. STEELE said that it hasn't been easy for the primary subsource to get information - he has had to dig for it. Moreover, STEELE said that he is not sure why the primary subsource would still be hanging around or be in country if he was under foreign control.

STEELE gave details of a REX TILLERSON-related report from the primary subsource - a report that STEELE is unsure the FBI possesses because

372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 10 of 26

STEELE didn't provide it to the FBI. STEELE said that in order to explain the report, he has to first talk about earlier ORBIS reporting from approximately 3 years ago, circa 2014. At that time, ORBIS was working on a hydrocarbon project for a client. It became clear from reporting during that project that Exxon-Mobil was well-placed in Russia and that TILLERSON had an atypical type of relationship with SECHIN. It was odd, STEELE said, to the point that STEELE thought that something was going on, particularly with SECHIN. There was more between TILLERSON and SECHIN than just shared hobbies like Harley-Davidsons. STEELE said that the reporting on this subject died down, the client moved on, and the sanctions regime kicked in. Then, circa December 2016, following the election, President-Elect TRUMP was initially flirting with MITT ROMNEY as a possible candidate for US Secretary of State. There was a long hiatus during which time there was general speculation about whether the position would go to ROMNEY or not. STEELE's primary subsorce picked up information from sources in Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that Washington, DC had received messages from Russia indicating that ROMNEY was an unacceptable candidate and that Russia wanted someone who was more acceptable and who might lift sanctions. TILLERSON's name, according to STEELE, isn't in the report from the primary subsorce, but what happened in the end was, to STEELE, surprising given the reporting. STEELE said that this report may have been shared with DAVID KRAMER - STEELE sent it to GLENN SIMPSON with the idea of having it shared.

STEELE explained how he shared the election-related reports with FGI [REDACTED]. He knew FGI [REDACTED] from his previous career. STEELE was trying to figure out the best way of sharing this information with his own government, but wasn't completely comfortable FGI [REDACTED]. In or around 15 November 2016, he met up with FGI [REDACTED]. He had two meetings at FGI [REDACTED]'s house; at the first meeting, they went through all of the reporting, and then they had a follow-up meeting. FGI [REDACTED] in turn talked to FGI [REDACTED]. STEELE knows that FGI [REDACTED], which STEELE described as not being easy for him. FGI [REDACTED]. STEELE also said that there have been problems (NFI) between him and his former employer.

STEELE is hesitant about sharing his information with FGI [REDACTED] as well as with CIA and NSA. He is concerned about the existence of hostile penetrations and his primary subsorce's security. STEELE says that his information needs to be handled in a need-to-know way.

STEELE said that FGI [REDACTED] - was not given as much information regarding the primary subsorce's network as he has given to the FBI.



[REDACTED]  
372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD 302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 11 of 26

STEELE was asked about his primary subsource's physical security. STEELE said that the primary subsource recently moved because of security concerns. Someone in the primary subsource's apartment complex, or someone at the gym, said something to him that was odd enough to make him decide to move. The primary subsource has a girlfriend - he has now moved into her house, which STEELE said won't leave a trace for him. STEELE said that while the primary subsource's girlfriend doesn't know all of the ins-and-outs of how things have worked between ORBIS and the primary subsource, she does know about the primary subsource's involvement with the dossier and his involvement with ORBIS. STEELE has met the primary subsource's girlfriend a couple of times. [REDACTED] She has not traveled to Russia with the primary subsource. STEELE does not believe that the girlfriend goes back to Russia. STEELE said that the girlfriend came to the UK with the primary subsource once, and they stayed at The Grosvenor Hotel.

When asked about STEELE's knowledge of the primary subsource's contact with Russian establishments, STEELE said that the primary subsource had someone over at the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC ask the primary subsource about where they could buy furniture, or something like that (NFI). STEELE said that it was strange, but nothing alarming. The primary subsource bumped into MIKHAIL KALUGIN on the street in Moscow. That was how the primary subsource knew that KALUGIN had been withdrawn from the United States. When the primary subsource asked about KALUGIN's leaving the United States, KALUGIN replied with something like, "It was better that I had left at that point." KALUGIN did not explicitly say that he was withdrawn because of the election controversy.

When asked about STEELE's knowledge of any journalists who have approached the primary subsource, STEELE said that in the January-February 2017 timeframe, a journalist who, he believed, was from AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, reached out to the primary subsource. The journalist told the primary subsource that he had heard on the London circuit that the primary subsource might have some information about the dossier. STEELE said that the primary subsource gave a bland answer, but the entire situation caused the primary subsource some consternation. The primary subsource took it as a warning that he was found out. This is why, explained STEELE, the primary subsource went to ground in the January-February 2017 timeframe and is why STEELE reached out to FIONA HILL to check on the primary subsource's whereabouts and safety.

When asked about STEELE's knowledge of whether any of the primary subsource's sub-sources knew that their information was used in the dossier, STEELE said that some of the primary subsource's sub-sources

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[REDACTED]  
372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 12 of 26

have talked to him in a cryptic manner about the reports. In one case, specifically the individual who provided the information to the primary subsource about GUBAREV, a Russian FSB team reportedly showed up asking questions after the dossier came out. STEELE believes that the primary subsource's sub-sources have an idea that their information was used in the dossier.

STEELE said that the primary subsource's mother and father [REDACTED] [REDACTED] STEELE understands that the primary subsource spoke to his parents over the last weekend. They did not indicate that they've had any problems or have experienced any harassment.

STEELE talked about the EROVINKIN situation. EROVINKIN was the former top aide to SECHIN in ROSNEFT who was found dead in December 2016. STEELE said that some people and the press have mistakenly tied EROVINKIN to the dossier - namely as a possible subsource on the SECHIN material. STEELE does not believe that EROVINKIN was one of the primary subsource's sub-sources; nevertheless, STEELE takes this whole situation very seriously and gives him pause. It reminds him of another, recent situation involving TRUBNIKOV, whose reporting is in the dossier. STEELE described TRUBNIKOV as "out there" engaged with Westerners. STEELE believes that there is a general feeling that TRUBNIKOV has been cultivated by Western intelligence. On this note, about three or four months ago, there was a shooting in the restroom of the Moscow restaurant named KOSMOS. The shooting was in broad daylight and an individual named KOSTYA MYASKI or MYANSKIY (sp) was the victim. STEELE believes that this was a warning shot to TRUBNIKOV. The incident occurred in the May 2017 timeframe.

STEELE was asked about ORBIS' business security procedures since the public release of the dossier. STEELE said that they had a situation arise where someone tried to spoof or impersonate the outside contractor who does ORBIS's IT security. There was an attempt to change the password for their internal system, which was detected. The IT security contractor was contacted to determine if the attempt was legitimate. If this had been successful, it could have exposed clients, but not sensitive reporting as that is kept offline.

STEELE was asked if ORBIS has had any situations, post-dossier, where ORBIS thought that it was being offered dangles or was the object of operational games. STEELE said that this question reminded him about the CODY SHEARER situation and the offer of tapes, which STEELE said he would talk about later. STEELE commented that the existence of tapes have been played out of proportion, adding that just the fact that the Russian government has leverage on President TRUMP is a problem. It would be difficult to know if a tape has been doctored. STEELE said that there is a

[REDACTED]

372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 13 of 26

concern, following the public release of the dossier, that any situation involving the provision of tapes can be a dangle or a controlled operation. STEELE has heard, and it is his understanding, that the situation involving CODY SHEARER and the tapes parallels something that the US Government has been involved with, but he plans on talking about that in more detail (see below). STEELE added that there are some "dark web" aspects to this, and STEELE asked about who was handling or analyzing "dark web" issues for the FBI.

STEELE did not provide funds to his primary subsource for payment to sub-sources. STEELE said that he provided a monthly retainer to his primary subsource, and said that a primary subsource might, in turn, pay for food or drinks while collecting information from his or her sub-sources, but the sub-sources are not paid for information. STEELE also advised that he sometimes paid for his primary subsource's trip expenses, save for the primary subsource's third 2016 trip to Moscow (which, STEELE remarked, was paid by an organization funded by the Russian Government -- in effect, STEELE summarized, Russia itself paid for his subsource's third trip to Moscow). The fact that sub-sources are not paid for their information was, to STEELE, an important point when it came to the issue of reporting quality -- STEELE advised that the lack of payment meant there was no incentive for sources to exaggerate their information. In one situation, STEELE advised that his company and/or FUSION GPS were involved in obtaining [REDACTED] for one of his primary subsource's sub-sources, who was [REDACTED]. STEELE recalled that ORBIS may have provided money [REDACTED], which were then procured by FUSION GPS. [REDACTED] were wiped for prints before being provided to the source (NFI).

STEELE provided some overall comments regarding the election-related dossier reports. The time between ORBIS's receipt of information to report publication was generally quick -- the time could vary, but often a report was generated two days to one week after the debriefing of the primary subsource. In some cases, where the difference between the date of information and the date of published report was within a day, the information for the report had most likely been received via electronic means [REDACTED] rather than through an in-person debriefing with the primary subsource.

In the election-related dossier reports, STEELE said that the commentary labeled "Company Comments" was generated by FUSION GPS. The first report from ORBIS to FUSION GPS was sent via direct courier; however, reports were typically encrypted and sent via email.



372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED]  
Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] STEELE, On 09/18/2017, Page 14 of 26

SSA [REDACTED] SIA Auten and STEELE went over each of the election-related dossier reports, with STEELE providing additional information on each report, as appropriate. STEELE explained that he intentionally left sequential gaps in the numbering of his election-related reports to obscure the actual number of reports being produced on the subject as well as to obscure the timing of the reports:

Company Intelligence Report 2016/80 (dated 20 June 2016)

Under "Detail," STEELE identified the "trusted compatriot" as his unnamed primary subsource. In the same report, Source A was the [REDACTED], while Source B was [REDACTED]. STEELE said that his primary subsource had a [REDACTED] who introduced the primary subsource to [REDACTED] and the primary subsource had met personally, and according to STEELE, the two had been speaking for a while (NFI). In the report, Source C was a [REDACTED] who was in direct contact with the primary subsource. This [REDACTED] had been a major sub-subsource for a long time on other matters.

In the report, STEELE identified Source D as SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN, who, according to STEELE, was in direct contact with the primary subsource. Sources E and F, according to STEELE, [REDACTED]. STEELE said that his primary subsource personally visited the hotel and spoke directly with these individuals.

Source G was [REDACTED] a "friend of a friend" of his primary subsource. During the primary subsource's trips to Russia, [REDACTED] and the primary subsource would meet for drinks. Later in 2016, [REDACTED] is the one who advised the primary subsource that because things were heating up, there had been a directive given advising that they (NFI) should not speak to anyone regarding Russia's interest in, or involvement with, the 2016 US Presidential Election.

STEELE indicated that the primary subsource collected the information for this report (2016/80) during a trip to Russia

Company Intelligence Report 2016/94 (dated 19 July 2016)

STEELE indicated that the information in this report was collected by the primary subsource from [REDACTED]

In paragraph 3 of the report, according to STEELE, the "compatriot" is a [REDACTED] STEELE's primary subsource's sub-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

372B-SM-2063661

Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele

On 09/18/2017, Page 15 of 26

subsource is [REDACTED]

The information in this report was not collected during an in-country visit by STEELE's primary subsource. [REDACTED] travels often, and STEELE said that his primary subsource talked to [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] was traveling. They likely communicated via phone or via Skype.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/100 (dated 5 August 2016)

STEELE referred to this reporting as being derived his primary [REDACTED]

but STEELE was not sure about the sub-subsource's identity, adding that he [STEELE] had destroyed all of his notes. STEELE offered to try and find out the identity of the unidentified sub-subsource.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/95 (handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE said that Source E in paragraphs 1 through 5 in this report was SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN, who was speaking to the primary subsource. It was MILLIAN who told the primary subsource the information in this report about MANAFORT, WIKILEAKS, and Russia's use of diplomatic staff and the emigre pension program as "cover."

In paragraph 6 of the report, the "separate source with direct knowledge" was an unidentified individual who was involved in [REDACTED]

STEELE could not remember the exact identity of the individual, but thought that he was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STEELE again noted that the primary subsource has an apartment in St. Petersburg, which made his travel to the city easy.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/97 (dated 30 July 2016)

[REDACTED]

372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED]  
Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of STEELE, On 09/18/2017, Page 16 of 26

STEELE said that the "trusted associate" in the first paragraph was his primary subsource, and the "Russian emigre figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate," was SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN. STEELE said that MILLIAN provided the entirety of this report. MILLIAN provided this information directly to STEELE's primary subsource, including the information in the report about how the "intelligence exchange" between the TRUMP team and the Kremlin went back at least 8 years.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/101 (handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE advised that paragraphs 1-3 of this report involve the primary subsource's obtaining of information [REDACTED]. STEELE described this report as dealing with "fallout information" -- that is, information about how the Russian government was dealing internally with the publicity surrounding Russian involvement in the US election.

STEELE indicated that the "Kremlin official involved in US relations" noted in paragraph 4 of the report was possibly MIKHAIL KALUGIN. STEELE said that his primary subsource bumped into KALUGIN in Moscow in August 2016.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/102 (dated 10 August 2016; handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE believed that the information in paragraphs 1 and 2 in this report -- though he was not 100% sure -- was derived from SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN. Based on the date of the report and on the information in the report, STEELE believes that the report was generated through personal contact between MILLIAN and his primary subsource. It also appears to STEELE that the report was generated in the United States. Because there is only one day between the date of information (9 August 2016) and the date of the report (10 August 2016), STEELE said that it doesn't appear that the report was generated following one of his primary subsource's trips to Russia. Instead, it appears that his primary subsource made contact while he [the primary subsource] was in the United States, and could therefore report the information to STEELE right away.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/105 (dated 22 August 2016)

STEELE advised that this report was based on a unique reporting stream. His primary subsource has a relationship with sub-subsource, [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

372B-SM-2063661

Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of STEELE

, On 09/18/2017 , Page 17 of 26

who is [REDACTED] STEELE did not know where his primary subsource met the [REDACTED] but believed that their original and ongoing interaction was about a different project involving a [REDACTED] dispute and litigation matters. STEELE does not know if his primary subsource [REDACTED] STEELE also noted that YANUKOVICH had gone to Volgograd.

According to STEELE, the "American political figure associated with Donald TRUMP and his campaign" noted in paragraph 3 of this report could be CHARLES DOLAN, speaking directly to STEELE's primary subsource.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/111 (dated 14 September 2016)

STEELE described this report as another "fallout" piece -- that is, a report about the Russian government was dealing internally with the public accusations and news stories regarding Russian interference in the 2016 election. The information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's direct contact with multiple sub-sources. These sub-sources included [REDACTED] and, in paragraph 5, a [REDACTED] STEELE explained that his primary subsource had [REDACTED] -- [REDACTED] STEELE's primary subsource had direct contact with all of these [REDACTED] sub-sources -- his contact with them was not brokered.

The "former top level Russian intelligence officer and Kremlin insider" referenced in the "Company Comment" for this report was [REDACTED].

Company Intelligence Report 2016/112 (dated 14 September 2016)

This report is derived from the [REDACTED] STEELE indicated that he had no doubt that [REDACTED] was the source of the reporting for this entire report. Even though this [REDACTED] travels, and [REDACTED] talks to STEELE's primary subsource [REDACTED] STEELE advised that the information for this particular report was obtained during one of his primary subsource's trips to Russia.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/113 (dated 14 September 2016)

[REDACTED]

372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED]  
Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] STEELE, On 09/18/2017, Page 18 of 26

STEELE advised that the information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's visit to St. Petersburg in early September 2016. The primary subsource had [REDACTED] in St. Petersburg -- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STEELE reiterated that his primary subsource traveled to St. Petersburg because of the apartment he has there -- an apartment he inherited from his aunt. The primary subsource visited St. Petersburg, and STEELE explained that he [the primary subsource] had done other work for STEELE in St. Petersburg. Reflecting on the content of this report, STEELE commented that he had never heard of AGALAROV prior to this report, save for EMIN AGALAROV's music. STEELE did not know much about AGALAROV as he had not crossed paths with him professionally.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/130 (dated 12 October 2016)

STEELE believed that the information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's interaction with one of the [REDACTED] -- perhaps the [REDACTED] as well as possibly [REDACTED], but STEELE was not completely sure.

STEELE believes that this report was produced after STEELE's meeting with FBI representatives in Rome, which had happened the week prior, and after the Kremlin event attended by his primary subsource. STEELE's primary subsource gave a presentation at the Kremlin event.

During the Kremlin event, the primary subsource also spoke to a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer at a party. One of the topics brought up during the primary subsource's conversation with the FSB officer was EDWARD SNOWDEN. This contact with the FSB officer was direct -- it was not brokered through another individual.

For the final paragraph of the report (paragraph 4), STEELE was unsure if the information was derived from the "SNOWDEN source" but thought it was unlikely to have been the FSB officer.

STEELE advised that his primary subsource had not had official contact with the FSB, though STEELE believes that his primary subsource may have talked to a local FSB officer about mining litigation.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/132 (dated 13 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that [REDACTED] was the source of the information in this report. This information was collected during the primary subsource's visit to Russia in October 2016 -- the same trip [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

372B-SM-2063661

Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of STEELE, On 09/18/2017, Page 19 of 26

during which the primary subsource collected the information in Company Intelligence Report 2016/130.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/134 (dated 18 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that this information in paragraphs 1-3 of this report is derived from his primary subsource's communication with [REDACTED] about CARTER PAGE. The primary subsource spoke to more individuals than just [REDACTED] about this particular subject. STEELE believes that the primary subsource spoke to a male, who STEELE described as a [REDACTED]

STEELE said that the information about MICHAEL COHEN in the fourth paragraph was derived from his primary subsource's interactions with sub-sources in the above-mentioned [REDACTED]."

Company Intelligence Report 2016/135 (dated 19 October 2016)

STEELE said that the information in this report was derived from the primary subsource's interactions with sub-sources in the [REDACTED]. It was through this structure of reporting that the primary subsource was told that MICHAEL COHEN had met with members of the Russian presidential legal team. STEELE believed that his primary subsource had met with a [REDACTED] insider. In STEELE's view, this [REDACTED] must have continued working inside [REDACTED]

Company Intelligence Report 2016/136 (dated 20 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that his primary subsource received this information from his [REDACTED] who lives in a third country, [REDACTED]

STEELE further advised that this [REDACTED] was scared [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 20 of 26

Reflecting on the "Company Comment," STEELE emphasized that the information was obtained directly rather than by any of the brokered, [REDACTED] reporting chains. STEELE's primary subsource obtained the information directly from his third-country sub-subsources.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/137 (dated 24 October 2016)

STEELE believes that this report was derived from his primary subsource's communication with the [REDACTED] but he was not 100% sure. Logically, STEELE said, since [REDACTED] is the one who reported on IGOR DIVEYKIN in an earlier report, it would follow that this report's material on DIVEYKIN also came from [REDACTED]. STEELE said that SECHIN would have told this sub-subsources about DIVEYKIN. STEELE added that [REDACTED] but also a professional in [REDACTED] own right [REDACTED]. SECHIN originally met [REDACTED] through professional interaction. STEELE believed that [REDACTED] professional work can be confirmed through open sources.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/139 (dated 27 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that the "senior Russian journalist working in the United States" in this report is [REDACTED] STEELE said this journalist seemed to know a lot about Russian emigres in the United States.

STEELE noted that, at this point, SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN had disappeared. STEELE believes that MILLIAN is currently in China or somewhere in the Far East. However, STEELE also knows that MILLIAN was present at the US Presidential Inauguration in January 2017, possibly as MICHAEL COHEN's guest at the hotel (NFI).

Intelligence Report, Information Dated 29 November 2016

This report was not included in the material STEELE provided to the FBI; he believes that it was provided to the FBI from Senator JOHN MCCAIN. The information in this report was generated through his primary subsource's communication with a senior MFA official. Reflecting on what he said earlier about some of the 2014 background of this particular report (see above), STEELE indicated that the earlier, 2014 information has been obtained from his primary subsource's communications with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
372B-SM-2063661

Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 21 of 26

Company Intelligence Report 2016/166, dated 13 December 2016

STEELE advised that this was his "favorite" report, involving MICHAEL COHEN, WEBZILLA, and ALEXEJ GUBAREV. The information on MICHAEL COHEN was obtained by the primary subsource's direct communication [REDACTED]

Company Intelligence Report 2016/086, dated 26 July 2015

First, STEELE was asked about the date of this report, specifically the year. Upon reflection, STEELE said that he believes this is a typo, and that the year was actually 2016 versus 2015.

STEELE advised that this cyber-related report in the dossier had been tasked by the FBI. It had been tasked by MICHAEL GAETA and was passed to the FBI.

Company Note, dated 19 October 2016

This is the CODY SHEARER and JON WINER report. STEELE advised that this was not an ORBIS report. STEELE received this report from JON WINER. The report pre-dates the dossier, and was produced circa April 2016. STEELE advised that SHEARER was an associate of SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL. SHEARER is also friends with a Turkish-American businessman with the last name of KHAN (NFI). KHAN was in touch with RUSLAN MANSIMOV, aka ASLAN TURAN, aka ASLAN TURANCI. According to STEELE, MANSIMOV was a "Southern Caucasus mongrel" -- Armenian/Azeri /Russian -- and worked in Turkey and Rome. KHAN brokered contact between SHEARER and MANSIMOV in New York and Istanbul. MANSIMOV worked for the FSB -- STEELE said that MANSIMOV's affiliation with the FSB was not a secret.

STEELE advised that this SHEARER/WINER report was not related to the dossier and was based on long-standing relationships among the identified individuals. STEELE said that the report had pluses and minuses. The "plus" of the reporting was that it chimed with the Miss Universe reporting, the Ritz-Carlton reporting, and the AGALAROV'S. The "minus" of the reporting was the fact that MANSIMOV was, according to STEELE, neither the most sophisticated nor impressive person. MANSIMOV's Russian language skills were not that great, as it was not his first language. STEELE opined that MANSIMOV's first language may be Azeri.

372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED]  
Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of STEELE, [REDACTED], On 09/18/2017, Page 22 of 26

After the dossier was published, MANSIMOV was not an active contact. MANSIMOV had claimed to be part of a faction in Russia, along with some other FSB officials, who were shocked at the attacks on the US election. MANSIMOV thought that the "crazies" (NFI) were out of control, and that it would blow up in their faces (NFI).

Recently, MANSIMOV has recontacted KHAN and was offering to provide tapes of President TRUMP. At least one of those tapes was related to the Miss Universe event and involved urine. KHAN brokered contact between SHEARER and MANSIMOV. SHEARER and MANSIMOV were actively discussing a deal for the tapes. MANSIMOV wanted money and "good standing" (NFI). MANSIMOV also claimed that an FSB technical officer with the rank of colonel was interested in defecting and wished to speak to them. The FSB officer had difficulty traveling; therefore, it was suggested that they meet in Kazakhstan.

SHEARER and MANSIMOV met in Istanbul and are considering an upcoming meeting in Spain within the coming weeks.

STEELE advised that he wished to keep this interaction "at an arm's length," as he does not want to fall into a trap. STEELE opined that this could be genuine, or a fabrication, or a set-up -- suggesting that it could involve a faction of the Democratic Party and he feared a possible FCPA violation. STEELE advised that WINER was aware of the situation, and was the one who informed STEELE about it. STEELE opined that SHEARER was not acting discreetly. STEELE said that the media was "sniffing" around MANSIMOV.

Additionally, STEELE advised he believed it was doubtful that IVANKA TRUMP was collecting large amounts of money. STEELE was complimentary of IVANKA TRUMP and considered her a good friend. STEELE further advised that his colleagues believed he was being naive about this, but he was surprised by the reporting on IVANKA. STEELE said he was skeptical about the IVANKA part of the reporting, but he could believe the rest of the report.

STEELE advised that there was a rumor that a video existed of President TRUMP "roughing up" his wife, MELANIA TRUMP, in an elevator. The rumor further insinuated that the Russians had purchased this tape.

STEELE said that another rumor had also surfaced that an unidentified American who had witnessed an argument about prostitutes at a hotel involved in the earlier-mentioned Miss Universe incident. The desk



372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 23 of 26

clerks wanted the prostitutes to sign in because of health and safety reasons, but the women refused. STEELE advised that the press could be in touch with the American witness.

STEELE discussed in greater detail DMITRIY RYBOLOVLEV and the property sale in Sunny Isles, Florida. STEELE said that RYBOLOVLEV had a client relationship with a Mongolian female who had been educated at MGIMO. This female worked in the United States with a PR/GR [public relations /government relations] firm. STEELE met her approximately 6 years ago and they worked together. She was very close to SERGEY LAVROV and RYBOLOVLEV. This female spoke with RYBOLOVLEV about the sale of the Sunny Isles property and the TRUMP connection with the sale. RYBOLOVLEV told her that he did not know anything about TRUMP, but the female did not believe him. STEELE sent this information as a report to FUSION GPS, but STEELE was not sure if he passed it to DAVID KRAMER, which is why STEELE believes it was not published publicly. STEELE added that there was a new person working for RYBOLOVLEV until very recently. There was information about this individual in a LE MONDE article. This individual had been kicked out of Monaco and had been involved in bribing officials. STEELE said there was also current reporting involving art fraud -- specifically, paying too much for art, reporting it lost, and laundering money (NFI)

STEELE talked about his other, newly-up-and-coming main agent network and that network's reporting on PAUL MANAFORT. ORBIS received reporting dated circa March-April 2017 regarding MANAFORT's involvement in the plot to elbow out PETRO POROSHENKO. This reporting also talked about the Ukraine peace plan, provided by a pro-Russian deputy - the material that was provided to MICHAEL COHEN and MICHAEL FLYNN. ORBIS pitched the circa March-April 2017 report about MANAFORT to **FGI**

STEELE said there are two memos regarding MANAFORT that were received by this newly-up-and-coming primary subsource. This individual understands that two entities, including the FBI, have received a larger amount of information or a bigger memo on MANAFORT based on access to MANAFORT's Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) file. The information in the FBI's possession talks about how MANAFORT has always been a Russian agent, about how he's always been with the FSB and how he's been run by named Russian case officers. STEELE says that this information is written in an exaggerated way (NFI). ORBIS believes the SBU file on MANAFORT itself has been doctored. The source claimed to know that the file had been doctored. STEELE said that the file has been doctored because that way, Kyiv is able to justify why it had MANAFORT under investigation. STEELE commented that, in Ukraine and all over Europe, they feel pressure from the White House to be able to justify any investigations that have been done.

372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED]  
Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD 302 of STEELE

On 09/18/2017, Page 24 of 26

This information was collected recently - within the last few months - and was post-election. STEELE believes that the new agent network reporting has a mixture of truth and falsehood. The new primary subsource has a good view into things and has reported on things with which he has directly been involved - in the actual room at the time. The new primary subsource is good when being interviewed to state whether he thinks something is right or something sounds wrong. STEELE said that the source is critically assessing another memo regarding MANAFORT -- a memo which is approximately three paragraphs long. STEELE said that ORBIS is receiving more information about this next week. STEELE planned to sit down with his source soon to go over all of the information and the source's assessment of the bigger SBU memo (NFI). When the assessment is complete, STEELE advised he would like to share it with the FBI. STEELE described his source in Ukraine as "top-notch" and advised he has a significant, 3-4 year reporting record. STEELE advised that MANAFORT was still active in Ukraine after the 2017 US Presidential Inauguration.

STEELE has heard separately that two US agencies (NFI) were working together in Germany and that it involved the offer of tapes and other documents. STEELE advised that a Volga German by the name of BITNER (NFI) was an FSB agent under business cover. A US agency was involved in an exchange involving BITNER, but CIA Director MIKE POMPEO pulled the plug at the end of last year. It was unclear to STEELE if this Germany-related information was connected to the earlier-referenced SHEARER-MANSIMOV information. STEELE also said that this was related to information in the "dark web" where, STEELE added, there has been talk that STEELE and the NSA are competing for the same materials (NFI). As with the MANSIMOV information, the media is also "sniffing" around the Germany situation. It is not the same media outlets who are "sniffing" around both stories, however. STEELE said that the media was not asking questions per se, but facilitating (NFI).

STEELE discussed two significant robberies that occurred in villas in the south of France. A total of up to two billion dollars in cash had been stolen from Ukrainian oligarch PINCHUK. PINCHUK's son-in-law had been using a villa. Part of the stolen money originated from a defrauding of Delta, a Ukrainian bank. PINCHUK's son-in-law embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars from Delta. The Chechens (NFI) subsequently stole that money, which went back into Russia. STEELE noted that the Chechens are often used by the Russians for such activity. If true, STEELE opined, this whole situation could create a huge slush fund for Russia.

ORBIS has also been getting reporting regarding Russian influence in the French and German elections. Regarding the 2017 French election, STEELE

[REDACTED]

372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED]  
Interview of ChristopherContinuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 25 of 26

said that things got perilously close to working for the Russians. STEELE said that it wasn't just about LE PEN, but that there was only one candidate who wasn't untainted by the Russians, and that was MACRON - the person who actually won. All three right-leaning candidates in France were held by the Russians. FILLON was compromised by Russia. One of the candidates was non-competitive. STEELE said the Russians attempted to change their support back to LE PEN at the end of the campaign period. STEELE advised that the Russians were now working on her niece.

Regarding the 2017 German election, STEELE said that the Russians were working on many influence campaigns, but had scaled back. The plan included propaganda about ANGELA MERKEL's health, but reportedly, MERKEL pushed back and spoke to PUTIN personally, warning him not to interfere with the election. PUTIN reportedly scaled back Russia's efforts.

STEELE advised that NIGEL FARAGE had been observed entering the Ecuadorian Embassy in London -- presumably to speak with JULIAN ASSANGE. STEELE believed that Russian funding had been funneling through the United Kingdom to promote Brexit. STEELE said that a young American -- possibly with the name of COTTRELL (NFI) -- had been caught laundering money. STEELE also said that EKATERINA PADERINA and her husband, AARON BANKS were two individuals involved in Russian influence and Brexit. FARAGE, TRUMP, and BANKS go back approximately four years. STEELE further advised that there was a Belize link with this, and that money was being laundered through Belize.

STEELE said that ORBIS was involved in some Kazakhstan-related and Cyprus-related business work, and some of the material from that work obviously falls within the bounds of the Special Counsel. STEELE was working on a Kazakh-related project involving an individual by the name of ABLYAZOV, embezzlement from BTA BANK, pyramid schemes, and connections to FELIX SATER and TRUMP SOHO. STEELE said that they want RICO up and running in the United States (NFI). STEELE brought along a Power Point presentation from the company ARCANUM explaining the SATER connection. STEELE provided a copy of this Power Point presentation to SSA [REDACTED] and SIA Auten (see attached). This information was slated to be provided to the US Department of Justice and the FBI as it involves a corrupt American official (NFI). SATER is also involved with the daughter of ABLYAZOV (NFI).

Regarding Cyprus, STEELE discussed a casino and golf complex. The GOLDEN LADY CONSORTIUM was attempting to put a casino in Cyprus circa 2015-2016. TRUMP, NAVIGANTE and SCENOPLUS (sp) were all involved, but the project failed. TRUMP tried to get a resort deal worth 450 million through RCB, a subsidiary of VNESHORG BANK (VTB). The deal was submitted to regulators. STEELE said that there were some references to this deal in the Cypriot



[REDACTED]

372B-SM-2063661

[REDACTED]

Interview of Christopher

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele, On 09/18/2017, Page 26 of 26

press. STEELE himself received this information from an American journalist.

STEELE was available for recontact, and advised that he wished to remain in contact with the FBI. Although STEELE believed the FBI owed money to STEELE and ORBIS for services and travel provided, STEELE believed it was more important that the United States government receive the information. STEELE was willing to provide the information to the FBI regardless of payment. STEELE advised that he would keep the same communication line open for future contact with SSA [REDACTED] as necessary.

[REDACTED]

FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** [REDACTED] **STEELE**  
**Date:** 08/02/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**SOURCE REPORTING**

**Date of Contact:** 07/19/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 NA  
**Type of Contact:** Telephonic  
**Date of Report:** 08/02/2016

<b>Substantive Case File Number</b>
[REDACTED]

**Check here if additional reporting is in Echo**  
 No

**Source Reporting:**  
 CHS revised CHS' original reporting (provided 07/05/2016) CHS [REDACTED] **STEELE** report dated 07/07/2016 regarding Russian cyber efforts. Guillermo QUINTERO, a member of the ROSNEFT board of directors, is not Italian. He is from South America and is believed to be Argentinian.

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
 First Level Approved By

FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** [REDACTED] **STEELE**  
**Date:** 07/29/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**SOURCE REPORTING**

**Date of Contact:** 07/19/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 NA  
**Type of Contact:** e-Mail  
**Date of Report:** 07/29/2016

<b>Substantive Case File Number</b>
[REDACTED]

**Check here if additional reporting is in Echo**  
 No

**Source Reporting:**

CHS [REDACTED] provided the following information, obtained from sub-sources, regarding the murder of former Russian Media Minister, Mikhail LESIN: Prior to his death in Washington DC in November 2015, LESIN had been in a dispute with relatives and associates of Yuri KOVALCHUK, a Russian oligarch close to Vladimir PUTIN, regarding the control of Russian media company, NATIONAL MEDIA GROUP (NMG). LESIN had succeeded in having KOVALCHUK's nephew, Kirill KOVALCHUK, removed from the NMG board of directors. LESIN was asserting power and influence and attempting to blackmail Alina KABAEVA, an associate of Kirill KOVALCHUK at NMG and former PUTIN mistress. KABAEVA went to Yuri KOVALCHUK, who decided to "move against" LESIN. LESIN "fled" to the U.S., staying at a hotel in the Dupont Circle area of Washington D.C. LESIN tried to reach out to various Russian business associates and U.S. authorities without success. LESIN was approached by a "representative" of Yuri KOVALCHUK on the evening of November 4, 2015. The two agreed to meet privately in LESIN's room on the 9th floor, where LESIN was later found dead.

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
 First Level Approved By

FD-1023	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** [REDACTED] **STEELE**  
**Date:** 11/17/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**SOURCE REPORTING**

**Date of Contact:** 11/01/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 ALAT Mike Gaeta  
**Type of Contact:** Telephonic  
**Date of Report:** 11/17/2016

<b>Substantive Case File Number</b>
97F-HQ-2063661

**Check here if additional reporting is in Echo**  
 No

**Source Reporting:**  
 On October 31, 2016, the online magazine Mother Jones published the following article written by David Corn: "A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump." The article sources a "former Western Intelligence officer" as providing memos to the FBI regarding Donald Trump's interactions with Russia. On November 1, 2016, the handling agent directly asked the CHS if the CHS spoke to the reporter in question. The CHS responded "yes I did." The CHS added that the CHS was "concerned about the behavior of [the FBI]" and was "troubled by the actions of [the FBI] last Friday." The CHS stated that the FBI owed the CHS a payment for services, however, the CHS stated "the payment was a secondary issue."

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
 First Level Approved By

FD-794b	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> PAYMENT REQUEST
---------	---

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 05/04/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**PAYMENT REQUEST**

**Payment Request Form Type:** General  
**Official Bureau Name:** Gaeta, Michael  
**UEID:** [REDACTED]  
**Phone Number:**  
**Payee Name:** Gaeta, Michael  
**UEID:** [REDACTED]  
**Payment Name:** Crown

**Enclosures:**

**Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.**

**Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.**

**CHS was opened/re-opened on:** 10/30/2013  
**Aggregate Total Paid:** \$74,000.00  
**Total Paid since re-open (if needed):** \$0.00  
**Total Paid in Current FY:** \$0.00

**Is this payment for medical expenses?** No

**Is the CHS expected to testify?** No

**Financial Justification**

**Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.**

Operationally justified. Expense payment for CHS for costs associated with sub-source endeavoring to set up meetings between WMDD and individual with information. Per IOD, original request for 5500 was cancelled and the instant request is being submitted.

The total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$74,000 in service payments. Another request for \$15,000 in service payments is in the system.

FD-794b	Page 1 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-794b	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> PAYMENT REQUEST
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The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment? No

**Period covered for this payment:**

**Begin:** 06/30/2015 **End:** 11/30/2016

Payment Request Amount		
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
Other Miscellaneous	CHS Expense	\$1,500.00

**Operational Payment justification narrative:**

The total aggregate payment threshold HAS NOT been met NOR exceeded. The CHS has not been paid any payments in this fiscal year. Moreover, the CHS has received a total of \$74000 since being opened in 2013. This DOES NOT reach the threshold. As such this is incorrectly noted above and no additional authority is required.

Warning: You have exceeded the aggregate threshold. It is recommended that you submit your request for additional authority to your appropriate FIMU.

**Total CHS Services:** \$0.00  
**Total CHS Expenses:** \$1,500.00  
**Total Agent Expenses:** \$0.00

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
 First Level Approved By  
 Second Level Approved By



<b>FD-794b</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST</b>
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<b>DRAFT TYPE</b>
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Request Type: General	Payment Type: Confidential	Forfeiture or Drug Related: No
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<b>INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE</b>
--

Official Bureau Name	UEID	Date of Request
Gaeta, Michael	[REDACTED]	05/04/2016
Field Office	Squad	User Dimension 4
International Operations	Legat Rome	Telephone Number

<b>INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE</b>
--

Payee Name	UEID
Gaeta, Michael	[REDACTED]

Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment?      No

Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
<b>STEELE</b>	[REDACTED]	CE-015      Crown		06/30/2015	11/30/2016

**Financial Justification:**      Operationally justified. Expense payment for CHS for costs associated with sub-source endeavoring to set up meetings between WMDD and individual with information. Per IOD, original request for 5500 was cancelled and the instant request is being submitted.

The total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$74,000 in service payments. Another request for \$15,000 in service payments is in the system.

<b>DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT</b>
--

Attributable to Agent or CHS	Catalog	File No.	Financial Program/Subprogram	Amount
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
CHS Expense		<b>Description:</b>	Other Miscellaneous	\$1,500.00
			Total For [REDACTED]	\$1,500.00
			<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,500.00</b>

<b>ACCOUNTING DETAILS</b>
---------------------------

Org Level 2	Fund	SOC	Sub SOC	BBFY	EBFY	Partition	User Dimension 5
						FBI	

**STEELE**      CE-015

<b>FD-794b</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST</b>
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<b>FINANCE OFFICE ONLY - SETTLEMENT OF ADVANCE</b>
--

Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials
Commitment: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Obligation: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Advance: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Expense: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Cash Receipt: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO): _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #:	_____	_____	_____	_____
Debit/Draft/EFT No.: <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	_____	_____	_____	_____
Prior Month Advance Balance: _____ This Advance: _____ Less Receipts: _____ Funds Returned and/or Cash on Hand: _____ Amount to be Reimbursed: _____				

<b>APPROVAL</b>
-----------------

	Name	Date/Time
Approved By SSA: _____	██████████	5/5/2016 8:10:21 AM
Certified by ASAC: _____	██████████	5/5/2016 9:19:14 AM
Draft Approval Officer: _____	_____	_____





UNCLASSIFIED

FD-794b	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> PAYMENT REQUEST
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE  
**Date:** 07/21/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**PAYMENT REQUEST**

**Payment Request Form Type:** General  
**Official Bureau Name:** Gaeta, Michael  
**UEID:** [REDACTED]  
**Phone Number:**  
**Payee Name:** Gaeta, Michael  
**UEID:** [REDACTED]  
**Payment Name:** Crown

**Enclosures:**

**Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.**

**Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.**

**CHS was opened/re-opened on:** 10/30/2013  
**Aggregate Total Paid:** \$74,000.00  
**Total Paid since re-open (if needed):** \$0.00  
**Total Paid in Current FY:** \$0.00

**Is this payment for medical expenses?** No

**Is the CHS expected to testify?** No

**Financial Justification**

**Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.**

Operationally justified. Service payment for CHS endeavoring with sub source(s) to respond to significant taskings from CyD and CID. As has been the case for all prior requests, despite efforts to rectify within DELTA, the total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$89,000 in service payments. Additionally, as incorrectly noted in the form the "aggregate threshold" HAS NOT been exceed. Despite numerous efforts to change this within DELTA, it incorrectly remains.

FD-794b	Page 1 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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UNCLASSIFIED

FD-794b	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> PAYMENT REQUEST
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The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment? No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 03/01/2016 End: 05/31/2016

Payment Request Amount		
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
██████████	E6	RQ
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$6,000.00

**Operational Payment justification narrative:**

Operationally justified. Service payment for CHS endeavoring with sub source(s) to respond to significant taskings from CyD and CID. As has been the case for all prior requests, despite efforts to rectify within DELTA, the total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$89,000 in service payments. Additionally, as incorrectly noted in the form **the "aggregate threshold" HAS NOT been exceed**. Despite numerous efforts to change this within DELTA, it incorrectly remains.

**Warning: You have exceeded the aggregate threshold. It is recommended that you submit your request for additional authority to your appropriate FIMU.**

**Total CHS Services:** \$6,000.00  
**Total CHS Expenses:** \$0.00  
**Total Agent Expenses:** \$0.00

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
First Level Approved By  
Second Level Approved By

FD-794b	Page 2 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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UNCLASSIFIED

<b>FD-794b</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST</b>
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<b>DRAFT TYPE</b>
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Request Type: General	Payment Type: Confidential	Forfeiture or Drug Related: No
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<b>INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE</b>
--

Official Bureau Name	UEID	Date of Request
Gaeta, Michael	[REDACTED]	07/21/2016
Field Office	Squad	User Dimension 4
International Operations	Legat Rome	Telephone Number

<b>INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE</b>
--

Payee Name	UEID
Gaeta, Michael	[REDACTED]

Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment?      No

Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
<b>STEELE</b>	[REDACTED]	CE-017      Crown		03/01/2016	05/31/2016

**Financial Justification:**      Operationally justified. Service payment for CHS endeavoring with sub source(s) to respond to significant taskings from CyD and CID. As has been the case for all prior requests, despite efforts to rectify within DELTA, the total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$89,000 in service payments. Additionally, as incorrectly noted in the form the "aggregate threshold" HAS NOT been exceed. Despite numerous efforts to change this within DELTA, it incorrectly remains.

<b>DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT</b>
--

Attributable to Agent or CHS	Catalog	File No.	Financial Program/Subprogram	Amount
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
CHS Service		<b>Description:</b>	CHS Services	\$6,000.00
			Total Fo [REDACTED]	\$6,000.00
			<b>Total</b>	<b>\$6,000.00</b>

<b>ACCOUNTING DETAILS</b>
---------------------------

Org Level 2	Fund	SOC	Sub SOC	BBFY	EBFY	Partition	User Dimension 5
						FBI	

**STEELE**      CE-017

<b>FD-794b</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST</b>
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<b>FINANCE OFFICE ONLY - SETTLEMENT OF ADVANCE</b>
--

Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials
Commitment: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Obligation: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Advance: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Expense: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Cash Receipt: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO): _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Debit/Draft/EFT No.: <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	_____	_____	_____	_____
Prior Month Advance Balance: _____ This Advance: _____ Less Receipts: _____ Funds Returned and/or Cash on Hand: _____ Amount to be Reimbursed: _____				

<b>APPROVAL</b>
-----------------

	Name	Date/Time
Approved By SSA: _____	██████████	7/21/2016 5:31:17 AM
Certified by ASAC: _____	██████████	7/21/2016 9:58:02 AM
Draft Approval Officer: _____	_____	_____



CHS PAYMENT RECEIPT

RECEIVED FROM



PRINT NAME

FOR THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF \$ 6000 FOR


4584 638

SERVICES RENDERED AND/OR \$ \_\_\_\_\_ FOR THE EXPENSES FOR THE PERIOD FROM

TO

X [Signature]  
CHS INITIALS

PAYING OFFICIAL ADVISED THAT MONIES PAID FOR SERVICES ARE CONSIDERED TAXABLE INCOME AND MUST REPORTED TO THE APPROPRIATE TAX AUTHORITIES.



DATE

FBI 8/12/2010

DATE

1/2/2010


DATE

CROWN

CHS PAYMENT NAME (PRINTED)



PAYING AGENT (PRINTED)



WITNESS (PRINTED)

FD-794b	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> PAYMENT REQUEST
---------	---

**HEADER**

Source ID: STEELE [REDACTED]  
Date: 09/29/2016  
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J  
Field Office/Division: International Operations  
Squad: Legat Rome

**PAYMENT REQUEST**

Payment Request Form Type: General  
Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael  
UEID: [REDACTED]  
Phone Number:  
Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael  
UEID: [REDACTED]  
Payment Name: Crown

**Enclosures:**

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013  
Aggregate Total Paid: \$74,000.00  
Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$0.00  
Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses? No

Is the CHS expected to testify? No

**Financial Justification**

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

NA

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

FD-794b	Page 1 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-794b	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> PAYMENT REQUEST
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Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment? No

**Period covered for this payment:**

**Begin:** 06/02/2016 **End:** 07/30/2016

Payment Request Amount		
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$7,500.00

**Operational Payment justification narrative:**

Source has provided intelligence regarding the murder of a Russian citizen in Washington DC that ties back to Russian OC members close to government officials in Russia. CHS has also provided significant cyber intrusion efforts by Russian government officials and private sector (energy) principals against western entities. CHS has also provided significant intelligence regarding criminal espionage efforts between entities in the US and Russia. This intelligence will be the subject of an additional request prepared by CD elements at a later date.

**Total CHS Services:** \$7,500.00  
**Total CHS Expenses:** \$0.00  
**Total Agent Expenses:** \$0.00

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
 First Level Approved By  
 Second Level Approved By

<b>FD-794b</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST</b>
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**DRAFT TYPE**

**Request Type:** General      **Payment Type:** Confidential      **Forfeiture or Drug Related:** No

**INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE**

<b>Official Bureau Name</b>		<b>UEID</b>	<b>Date of Request</b>
Gaeta, Michael		[REDACTED]	09/29/2016
<b>Field Office</b>	<b>Squad</b>	<b>User Dimension 4</b>	<b>Telephone Number</b>
International Operations	Legat Rome		

**INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE**

<b>Payee Name</b>	<b>UEID</b>
Gaeta, Michael	[REDACTED]

Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment?      No

Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
<b>STEELE</b>	[REDACTED] CE-019	Crown		06/02/2016	07/30/2016

Financial Justification:      NA

**DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT**

Attributable to Agent or CHS	Catalog	File No.	Financial Program/Subprogram	Amount
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
CHS Service		<b>Description:</b>	CHS Services	\$7,500.00
			Total For [REDACTED]	\$7,500.00
			Total	\$7,500.00

**ACCOUNTING DETAILS**

Org Level 2	Fund	SOC	Sub SOC	BBFY	EBFY	Partition	User Dimension 5
						FBI	

**STEELE**      CE-019



<b>FD-794b</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST</b>
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<b>FINANCE OFFICE ONLY - SETTLEMENT OF ADVANCE</b>
--

Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials
Commitment: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Obligation: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Advance: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Expense: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Cash Receipt: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO): _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Debit/Draft/EFT No.: <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	_____	_____	_____	_____
Prior Month Advance Balance: _____				
This Advance: _____				
Less Receipts: _____				
Funds Returned and/or Cash on Hand: _____				
Amount to be Reimbursed: _____				

<b>APPROVAL</b>
-----------------

	Name	Date/Time
Approved By SSA: _____	██████████	9/29/2016 10:47:26 AM
Certified by ASAC: _____	██████████	10/13/2016 6:39:40 PM
Draft Approval Officer: _____	_____	_____

FD-794b	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> PAYMENT REQUEST
---------	---

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/18/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**PAYMENT REQUEST**

**Payment Request Form Type:** General  
**Official Bureau Name:** Gaeta, Michael  
**UEID:** [REDACTED]  
**Phone Number:**  
**Payee Name:** Gaeta, Michael  
**UEID:** [REDACTED]  
**Payment Name:** Crown

**Enclosures:**

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

**CHS was opened/re-opened on:** 10/30/2013  
**Aggregate Total Paid:** \$74,000.00  
**Total Paid since re-open (if needed):** \$0.00  
**Total Paid in Current FY:** \$0.00

**Is this payment for medical expenses?** No

**Is the CHS expected to testify?** No

**Financial Justification**

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

\$15,000 service payment initiated by Counterintelligence Division for information from July 5, 2016 to October 3, 2016, to include CHS meeting with CD representatives in Rome on October 3, 2016.

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

FD-794b	Page 1 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-794b	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> PAYMENT REQUEST
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Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment? No

**Period covered for this payment:**

Begin: 07/05/2016 End: 10/03/2016

Payment Request Amount		
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
97F-HQ-2063661	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$15,000.00

**Operational Payment justification narrative:**

This payment was initiated by SA Brian Gessford and approved by the CD chain of command who are assigned to the captioned 97F investigation. The funds have been transferred to IOD from CD in advance of payment to the CHS. The following statement is from UC Joe Pientka of CD. Team investigators met with CHS in Rome on October 3, 2016.

CHS STEE provides very interesting and unique reporting specific to the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation. His/her reporting is corroborative of Intel we received from a FGI [REDACTED] that predicated our investigation. To date, we have not received Intel from other sources that so closely tracks to the predicate. In addition, the CHS reporting provided PC for a FISA (currently in coordination, but an expedite is expected this week) on a subject of CROSSFIRE HURRICANE – CROSSFIRE DRAGON. The CROSSFIRE HURRICANE Team would like to continue working with you to possibly task your source to provide the FBI with intelligence and evidence in support of our investigation.

**Total CHS Services:** \$15,000.00  
**Total CHS Expenses:** \$0.00  
**Total Agent Expenses:** \$0.00

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
First Level Approved By  
Second Level Approved By

FD-794b	Page 2 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-794b	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST</b>
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<b>DRAFT TYPE</b>
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Request Type: General	Payment Type: Confidential	Forfeiture or Drug Related: No
-----------------------	----------------------------	--------------------------------

<b>INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE</b>
--

Official Bureau Name	UEID	Date of Request
Gaeta, Michael	[REDACTED]	10/18/2016
Field Office	Squad	User Dimension 4
International Operations	Legat Rome	Telephone Number

<b>INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE</b>
--

Payee Name	UEID
Gaeta, Michael	[REDACTED]

Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment?      No

Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
<b>STEELE</b>	[REDACTED]	CE-020      Crown		07/05/2016	10/03/2016

<b>Financial Justification:</b>	\$15,000 service payment initiated by Counterintelligence Division for information from July 5, 2016 to October 3, 2016, to include CHS meeting with CD representatives in Rome on October 3, 2016.
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<b>DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT</b>
--

Attributable to Agent or CHS	Catalog	File No.	Financial Program/Subprogram	Amount
		97F-HQ-2063661	[REDACTED]	
CHS Service		<b>Description:</b>	CHS Services	\$15,000.00
			Total For 97F-HQ-2063661	\$15,000.00
			<b>Total</b>	<b>\$15,000.00</b>

<b>ACCOUNTING DETAILS</b>
---------------------------

Org Level 2	Fund	SOC	Sub SOC	BBFY	EBFY	Partition	User Dimension 5
						FBI	

**STEELE**      CE-020



<b>FD-794b</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST</b>
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<b>FINANCE OFFICE ONLY - SETTLEMENT OF ADVANCE</b>
--

Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials
Commitment: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Obligation: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Advance: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Expense: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Cash Receipt: _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO): _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #:	_____	_____	_____	_____
Debit/Draft/EFT No.: <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	_____	_____	_____	_____
Prior Month Advance Balance: _____ This Advance: _____ Less Receipts: _____ Funds Returned and/or Cash on Hand: _____ Amount to be Reimbursed: _____				

<b>APPROVAL</b>
-----------------

	Name	Date/Time
Approved By SSA: _____	██████████	10/19/2016 9:58:16 AM
Certified by ASAC: _____	██████████	10/19/2016 10:24:49 AM
Draft Approval Officer: _____	_____	_____

**STEELE** ██████████ **CE-020**

FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 07/07/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**SOURCE REPORTING**

**Date of Contact:** 07/05/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 ALAT Mike Gaeta  
**Type of Contact:** In Person  
**Country:** UNITED KINGDOM  
**City:** London  
**Date of Report:** 07/07/2016

**Substantive Case File Number**

[REDACTED]

**Check here if additional reporting is in Echo**

No

**Source Reporting:**

On July 5, 2016, CHS provided the following information:

Insiders at the Kremlin are very concerned about the current FBI criminal investigation into the Russian athletics doping scandal. Head of the Presidential Administration, Sergei IVANOV, referred to whistleblower, Grigoriy RODCHINKOV, as a "perebezhchik" (defector), who had access to highly sensitive information on Russian doping activities. A Kremlin lawyer stated that the IVANOV and PUTIN were very concerned about the investigation. A Russian public relations consultant with close ties to U.S. firm, KETCHUM, was instructed by the Kremlin to launch a discreet PR counter offensive against RODCHINKOV, the USG, IAAF and IOC, to discredit each.

In June 2016, Russian oligarch and close PUTIN associate, Gennady TIMCHENKO, discussed rumors surrounding the recent deaths of former heads of the Russian Anti-Doping Agency, Vyachslav SINYEV and FNU KAMAYEV. TIMCHENKO is also worried about the criminal investigation. He stated that SINYEV died of natural causes in February 2016. However, TIMCHENKO stated that KAMAYEV had died "like Paul I (Tsar)," who was brutally murdered but presented as having had a sudden medical problem. TIMCHENKO implied that KAMAYEV had been murdered on the Kremlin's orders in order to prevent him from speaking about the Russian state sponsored doping efforts. This also served to terrify Russian sport insiders.

In June 2016, Russian olympian, Yelena ISINBAYEVA, stated that she had been paid \$100,000 by the Kremlin to lobby against the ban on Russian athletes at the Rio Olympics. ISINBAYEVA put her name to an op-ed piece published in the New York Times on June 15, 2016. Former Russian Athletics Federation head, Valentin BLAKNICHEV, stated that he had been bribed by the Russian Ministry of Sport to cover up various doping cases, to include the one against Olympic gymnast, Alina KABAEVA. KABAEVA, who became Putin's mistress, had been trained by Irina Viner, Alishir's USMANOV's wife. The bribe to KABAEVA allowed her to "lie low" and then return to compete internationally at the highest levels.

FD-1023	Page 1 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
First Level Approved By  
Second Level Approved By

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID: STEELE [REDACTED]  
Date: 07/07/2016  
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J  
Field Office/Division: International Operations  
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 07/05/2016  
List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):  
ALAT Mike Gaeta  
Type of Contact: In Person  
Country: UNITED KINGDOM  
City: London  
Date of Report: 07/07/2016

Substantive Case File Number

[REDACTED]



**Check here if additional reporting is in Echo**

No

**Source Reporting:**

On July 5, 2016, CHS provided the following information:

A former top level intelligence officer divided Government of Russia (GOR) state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into the following four categories (in priority order): 1) Targeting foreign (western) governments; 2) penetrating leading foreign business corporations, especially banks; 3) domestic monitoring of Russian elite, and; 4) attacking political opponents at home and abroad. The FSB is the lead organization within the GOR for cyber operations.

A senior banking official within the GOR who receives cyber generated intelligence, stated the following: there had been only "limited success" in penetrating "first tier" foreign targets. These comprised western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence services and central banks. To compensate, massive effort had been made to penetrate with greater success, "secondary targets," particularly western private banks and governments of smaller states allied to the West. Latvia was mentioned in this context. Hundreds of agents, consciously cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been compromised, were recruited in this effort. Many such agents had/have ethnic or family ties to Russia or were incentivized financially (money or contractual favors) to cooperate. The Russian Central Bank is complicit in the funding of this program and aiding in the laundering of these funds. This individual also stated that non-state sponsored cyber crime is becoming an increasing problem inside of Russia for GOR authorities. In 2015, there had been more than twenty attempts at serious cyber efforts to steal funds from corresponding bank accounts held in Russia, comprising several billion Roubles. Additionally, there are over 15 major organized crime groups inside of Russia operating in the cyber "space" which are largely outside of FSB control. Some of these groups are called ANUNAK, BUKTRAP and METEL. No further information was provided.

A Russian IT specialist reported in June 2016 that the FSB used coercion and blackmail to carry out its "deniable" offensive cyber operations. The individual had been caught laundering money for private Russian banks through Latvia by FSB Department K. The FSB threatened the individual with prosecution and prison if he/she did not cooperate with the FSB. Another individual began to cooperate with the FSB after being caught running an illegal pornographic website. The Russian IT specialist stated that Ilya OSSIPOV, a U.S. citizen of Russian/Jewish origin, had been knowingly approached and propositioned by the FSB while on a business trip to Russia. OSSIPOV was originally from Nizhniy Novogrod and developed the IT platform known as "I2I." OSSIPOV was in Russia to attract investors for his new platform to upgrade it onto mobile platforms. The FSB was aware of this and offered to provide capital to OSSIPOV in return for being able to access and modify "I2I" with a view towards targeting priority Turkish and Arab targets. The FSB intended to plant Trojans in the software, OSSIPOV initially refused the offer. The FSB also implied they had had success installing cheap Russian IT games containing their own malware on targets' PC's and other platforms. It was unknown if there was any further interaction with OSSIPOV. This IT specialist also stated that the "TELEGRAM" enciphered commercial system had been heavily targeted and likely compromised by the FSB because it was used frequently by Russian political activists.

An IT operator inside Russian energy giant ROSNEFT, who had been employed on conventional defensive IT work for ROSNEFT, advised of the following: this IT operator had been under instruction for the last year to conduct an offensive cyber operation against a former foreign director of ROSNEFT, Italian citizen, Guillermo QUINTERO. The FSB has successfully penetrated QUINTERO's personal IT and through this had accessed various important institutions in Italy and other countries through the back door, in particular, BANK INTESSA. Former GOR intelligence official and ROSNEFT CEO, Igor SECHIN, wanted QUINTERO's movements and meetings monitored to confirm/corroborate what QUINTERO was advising SECHIN and the ROSNEFT board. This operation has also provided ROSNEFT and the FSB with access to ex-Italian prime minister BERLUSCONI's IT, communications and network of international contacts. According to the IT operator, the technical expectations of this operation by the FSB had already been exceeded. This individual also stated that it was highly likely that a similar FSB cyber operation was conducted against an ExxonMobil member of the ROSNEFT Board (possibly Donald HUMPHREYS).

FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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First Level Approved By  
Second Level Approved By

FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/19/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**SOURCE REPORTING**

**Date of Contact:** 10/19/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 ALAT Mike Gaeta  
**Type of Contact:** e-Mail  
**Date of Report:** 10/19/2016

<b>Substantive Case File Number</b>
97F-HQ-2063661

**Check here if additional reporting is in Echo**  
 No

**Source Reporting:**  
 The attached document is a memo from the CHS describing intelligence that CHS received from Jon WINER, US Department of State on October 18, 2016. CHS has stated that CHS has a business association with WINER. The memo describes how WINER obtained the intelligence and that it is apparently from a FSB sub-source. The information describes the FSB efforts at successfully compromising Donald TRUMP.

**SIGNATURE**

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 First Level Approved By  
 Second Level Approved By

FD-1023	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/18/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**SOURCE REPORTING**

**Date of Contact:** 10/18/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
ALAT Mike Gaeta  
**Type of Contact:** Other  
**Other Contact Type:** Skype  
**Date of Report:** 10/18/2016

**Substantive Case File Number**

97F-HQ-2063661

**Check here if additional reporting is in Echo**

No

**Source Reporting:**

On October 18, 2016, in response to specific tasking from FBI HQ CI representatives investigating the subject matter at hand, CHS STEE [REDACTED] provided handling agent with the following information which was generated by three different sub-sources:

**Sub-Source 1:**

On July 7, 2016, Carter PAGE gave a high profile lecture in Moscow. On July 8, 2016, PAGE met personally and alone with Rosneft CEO, Igor SECHIN. The meeting may have occurred in the same building as the lecture. During this meeting, SECHIN offered the following deal to PAGE, as a representative of the Donald TRUMP campaign: if TRUMP were to become President, SECHIN/ROSNEFT would offer 19% of ROSNEFT stock to TRUMP's administration to be "brokered" for sale to U.S. investors, as the TRUMP administration would see fit, in exchange for TRUMP lifting U.S. (Ukrainian-based) sanctions against Russia. PAGE's response was, "if my guy gets in, then he will lift sanctions."

**Sub Source 2:**

Michael COHEN is a private attorney for Donald TRUMP. COHEN is described as a "pivotal figure" in the chain of communication between the TRUMP campaign and the Kremlin. COHEN's wife is Russian. Her father, Yefin Fima SHUSTERMAN, is a successful Moscow-based property developer in Russia. SHUSTERMAN owns a Dacha in Barvikha, Russia outside of Moscow. This area is reserved only for the political and business elite. The Russian political leadership own their Dacha's in Barvikha.

**Sub-Source 3:**

Within the last few days, Igor SECHIN acknowledged that TRUMP would not win the presidential campaign. Additionally, PUTIN has admitted to senior intelligence officers that the FSB efforts to influence the US Presidential campaign failed and were "fucked up." Those involved were dismayed at the lack of traction of material leaked against Hillary CLINTON. They advised that the most compromising material has been put out but that they will "drip-feed" the remaining material through WIKILEAKS. The communication chain between the Kremlin and TRUMP's campaign is aware of this plan.

FD-1023	Page 1 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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First Level Approved By  
Second Level Approved By

FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** [REDACTED] **STEELE**  
**Date:** 10/21/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**SOURCE REPORTING**

**Date of Contact:** 10/20/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 ALAT Mike Gaeta  
**Type of Contact:** Other  
**Other Contact Type:** Skype/email  
  
**Date of Report:** 10/21/2016

<b>Substantive Case File Number</b>
97F-HQ-2063661

**Check here if additional reporting is in Echo**  
 No

**Source Reporting:**  
 On October 20, 2016, CHS [REDACTED] **STEE** provided the following information, the body of which is contained in the attached report prepared by the CHS:

Donald TRUMP's personal attorney, Michael COHEN, met with Kremlin officials in August 2016 in the Czech capital of Prague under the cover of a Russian organization called ROSSOTRUDNICHESTEVO. Pro-PUTIN Russian Duma member, Konstantin KOSACHEV, Head of the Foreign Relations Committee, is reported as the facilitator and a participant of this meeting.

**SIGNATURE**

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 First Level Approved By  
 Second Level Approved By

FD-1023	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE [REDACTED]  
Date: 07/07/2016  
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J  
Field Office/Division: International Operations  
Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Substantive Case File Number: [REDACTED]  
Stat Count: 4  
Category: Countries  
Sub Category: Russia  
Stat Type: Activities Observed/Detected by CHS  
Sub Stat Type: Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Activity  
Agency: N/A  
Stat: FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE

Other Comments:

Total stat count claimed on this form: 4

SIGNATURE

Submitted By  
First Level Approved By  
Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1023	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	 <b>OFFICIAL RECORD</b> <small>Document participants have digitally signed. All signatures have been verified by a certified FBI information system.</small>
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/24/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**SOURCE REPORTING**

**Date of Contact:** 10/24/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 NA  
**Type of Contact:** e-Mail  
**Date of Report:** 10/24/2016

<b>Substantive Case File Number</b>
97F-HQ-2063661

**Check here if additional reporting is in Echo**  
 No

**Source Reporting:**

On October 24, 2016, CHS STEE [REDACTED] provided the following information, summarized below but contained in the attached report:  
 Igor DIVYEKIN, the main interlocutor between TRUMP CAMPAIGN advisor, Carter PAGE, and the Kremlin, was moved from the Presidential Administration Internal Affairs department to Charge d'Affaires at the State Duma to give DIVYEKIN cover and "diplomatic immunity" as protection from the USG and other foreign governments.

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
 First Level Approved By  
 Second Level Approved By

FD-1023	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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<b>FD-209a</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS CONTACT REPORT
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 07/07/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**CONTACT REPORT**

**Date of Contact:** 07/05/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 ALAT Mike Gaeta  
**Type of Contact:** In Person  
**Country:** UNITED KINGDOM  
**Address Line 1:** London  
**Address Line 2:**  
**City:** London  
**ZIP/Postal Code:**

**Anomalies:**  
NA

**Life Changes:**  
NA

**FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:**  
NA

**Other:**  
NA

**PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT**

**HQ Division:** Criminal Investigative Division  
**Program:** TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM  
**Subprogram:** EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

**This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.**

**Substantive Case File Number:**  
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
---------	---

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE [REDACTED]  
Date: 07/07/2016  
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J  
Field Office/Division: International Operations  
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: In Person  
Country: UNITED KINGDOM  
Address Line 1: London  
Address Line 2:  
City: London  
ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:

NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division  
Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM  
Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

[REDACTED]

FD-209a	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
---------	---

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE [REDACTED]  
Date: 08/02/2016  
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J  
Field Office/Division: International Operations  
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):  
NA

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Anomalies:  
NA

Life Changes:  
NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:  
None

Other:  
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division  
Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM  
Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

Substantive Case File Number:  
[REDACTED]

<b>FD-209a</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS CONTACT REPORT
----------------	--

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 07/29/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**CONTACT REPORT**

**Date of Contact:** 07/19/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 NA  
**Type of Contact:** e-Mail

**Anomalies:**  
NA

**Life Changes:**  
NA

**FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:**  
NA

**Other:**  
NA

**PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT**

**HQ Division:** Criminal Investigative Division  
**Program:** TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM  
**Subprogram:** EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

**Substantive Case File Number:**  
[REDACTED]



<b>FD-209a</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS CONTACT REPORT
----------------	--

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/19/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**CONTACT REPORT**

**Date of Contact:** 10/19/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 ALAT Mike Gaeta  
**Type of Contact:** e-Mail

**Anomalies:**  
NA

**Life Changes:**  
NA

**FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:**  
 After discussion with SA Steve Somma (CD), CHS was made aware that a target of the 97F-HQ-2063661 investigation is aware that two private investigators have been hired to find information on the target. No other information was provided.

**Other:**  
NA

**PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT**

**This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.**

**Substantive Case File Number:**  
 97F-HQ-2063661

<b>FD-209a</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS CONTACT REPORT
----------------	--

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/18/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**CONTACT REPORT**

**Date of Contact:** 10/18/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
ALAT Mike Gaeta  
**Type of Contact:** Other  
**Other Contact Type:** Skype

**Anomalies:**  
NA

**Life Changes:**  
NA

**FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:**  
None

**Other:**  
NA

**PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT**

**This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.**

**Substantive Case File Number:**  
97F-HQ-2063661

<b>FD-209a</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS CONTACT REPORT
----------------	--

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/21/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**CONTACT REPORT**

**Date of Contact:** 10/20/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 ALAT Mike Gaeta  
**Type of Contact:** Other  
**Other Contact Type:** Skype/email

**Anomalies:**  
NA

**Life Changes:**  
NA

**FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:**  
NA

**Other:**  
NA

**PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT**

**This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.**

**Substantive Case File Number:**  
97F-HQ-2063661

<b>FD-209a</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS CONTACT REPORT
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/24/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**CONTACT REPORT**

**Date of Contact:** 10/24/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 NA  
**Type of Contact:** e-Mail

**Anomalies:**  
NA

**Life Changes:**  
NA

**FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:**  
NA

**Other:**  
NA

**PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT**

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<b>FD-209a</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> CHS CONTACT REPORT
----------------	--

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 11/17/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**CONTACT REPORT**

**Date of Contact:** 11/01/2016  
**List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):**  
 ALAT Mike Gaeta  
**Type of Contact:** Telephonic

**Anomalies:**  
 CHS confirmed to an outside third party that CHS has a confidential relationship with the FBI.

**Life Changes:**  
 NA

**FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:**  
 NA

**Other:**  
 CHS confirmed to an outside third party that CHS has a confidential relationship with the FBI.

**PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT**

**Substantive Case File Number:**  
 97F-HQ-2063661



For documentation into the CHS file # **STEELE** code name "CROWN":

As stated by the CHS numerous times and as observed and noted by ALAT Mike Gaeta throughout the course of the relationship with the Bureau, the CHS' original and continuing motivation to engage the Bureau as a CHS was twofold: 1) to provide intelligence to the Bureau regarding high level criminal activity engaged in by Eurasian actors, and 2) to receive compensation for intelligence deemed valuable.

ALAT Mike Gaeta

For documentation into the CHS file # **STEELE** code name "CROWN":

As documented in a FD-1023 dated 11/17/16 and in the source closing document (FD-1040a) dated 11/17/16:

On October 31, 2016, the online magazine Mother Jones published the following article written by David Corn: "A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump." The article sources a "former Western Intelligence officer" as providing memos to the FBI regarding Donald Trump's interactions with Russia. On November 1, 2016, the handling agent directly asked the CHS if the CHS spoke to the reporter in question. The CHS responded "yes I did." The CHS added that the CHS was "concerned about the behavior of [the FBI]" and was "troubled by the actions of [the FBI] last Friday." The CHS stated that the FBI owed the CHS a payment for services however the CHS stated "the payment was a secondary issue." At that time, the handling agent advised CHS that the nature of the relationship between the FBI and CHS would change completely and that it was unlikely that the FBI would continue a relationship with the CHS. Additionally, handling agent advised that CHS was not to operate to obtain any intelligence whatsoever on behalf of the FBI. There was no further contact with the CHS and the CHS was closed on November 17, 2016.

The November 1, 2016 conversation was the first and only instance that the CHS indicated to the handling agent a motivation for CHS' actions and engagement with the Bureau other than originally described. This was the first and only instance that the handling agent observed a motivation by the CHS other than originally described.

ALAT Mike Gaeta

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**Electronic Communication**

**Title:** (U//FOUO) CHS STEELE Admonishments

**Date:** 02/02/2016

**From:** ROME

**Contact:** GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH, [REDACTED]

**Approved By:** [REDACTED]

**Drafted By:** GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH

**Case ID #:** [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

**Synopsis:** (U//FOUO) A/Legat Mike Gaeta met in person with CHS STEELE on January 25, 2016 and verbally admonished the CHS.

**Enclosure(s):** Enclosed are the following items:

- 1. (U//FOUO) AGG

**Details:**

On January 25, 2016, A/Legat Mike Gaeta met with STEELE to debrief the CHS. After the debriefing was completed, A/Legat Gaeta verbally admonished the CHS with CHS admonishments, which the CHS fully acknowledged, signed and dated. The signed CHS AGG admonishments form is attached to this EC as a 1A.

◆◆

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

CHS Admonishments

- Filing and Security\*
- Administrative\*
- Admonishments\***
- Witness Information\*
- Synopsis
- Approval Routing\*
- Review

Header

**STEELE**  
4/17/2019

GAETA, MICHAEL J.  
International Operations  
Legat Rome

Admonishments

1. The CHS's assistance and the information provided to the FBI are entirely voluntary.
2. The CHS must provide truthful information to the FBI.
3. The CHS must abide by the instructions of the FBI and must not take or seek to take any independent actions on behalf of the US Government.
4. The US Government will strive to protect the CHS's identity but cannot guarantee it will not be divulged.

Additional Admonishments

If applicable to the particular circumstances of the CHS, or as they become applicable, the following admonishments must be completed. They need not be given if they have no relevance to the CHS's situation. (For example, the immunity instruction need not be given unless there is an issue of apparent criminal liability or penalties relating to the CHS. The Attorney General's Guidelines emphasize, however, that whether or not these instructions are given, the FBI has no authority to confer immunity and that agents must avoid giving any person the erroneous impression that they have any such authority.) Indicate whether the following instructions were given:

1. The FBI on its own cannot promise or agree to any immunity from prosecution or other consideration by an FPO, a state or local prosecutor, or a court in exchange for the CHS's cooperation because the decision to confer any such benefit lies within the exclusive discretion of the prosecutor or court. However, the FBI will consider (but not necessarily act upon) advising the appropriate prosecutor of the nature and extent of the CHS's assistance to the FBI. (This instruction should be given if there is any apparent issue of criminal liability or penalty.)\*  
 Yes  No  The Admonishment #1 field is required.
2. The CHS is not authorized to engage in any criminal activity and has no immunity from prosecution for any unauthorized criminal activity. (This instruction is not necessary for CHSs who have such authorization. This instruction should be repeated if the CHS is suspected of committing unauthorized illegal activity.)\*  
 Yes  No  The Admonishment #2 field is required.
3. The CHS is not an employee of the US Government and may not represent himself/herself as such. (This instruction should be given to all CHSs except under those circumstances where the CHS previously has been or continues to be otherwise employed by the US Government.)\*  
 Yes  No  The Admonishment #3 field is required.
4. The CHS may not enter into any contract or incur any obligation on behalf of the US Government, except as specifically instructed or approved by the FBI. (This instruction should be given to all CHSs except to those CHSs who are otherwise authorized to enter into a contract or incur an obligation on the behalf of the US.)\*  
 Yes  No  The Admonishment #4 field is required.
5. No promises or commitments can be made, except by the Department of Homeland Security, regarding the alien status of any person or the right of any person to enter or remain in the US. (This instruction should be provided if there is any apparent issue of immigration status that relates to the CHS.)\*  
 Yes  No  The Admonishment #5 field is required.
6. The FBI cannot guarantee any rewards, payments, or other compensation to the CHS. \*  
 Yes  No  The Admonishment #6 field is required.
7. Each time a CHS subject to the AGGs receives any awards, payments, or other compensation from the FBI, the CHS shall be advised at the time of the payment that he/she is liable for any taxes that may be owed on that compensation.\*  
 Yes  No  The Admonishment #7 field is required.
8. Whenever it becomes apparent that the CHS may have to testify in a court or other proceeding, the CHS must be advised of that possibility.\*  
 Yes  No  The Admonishment #8 field is required.

Additional Instructions Based on Employment or Position

1. If a CHS is in a position to obtain information from a subject who is facing pending criminal charges for whom his/her Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, the CHS must be advised not to solicit such information from the subject regarding the pending charges.\*  
 Yes  No  The Additional Instructions #1 field is required.
2. For CHSs in a position to obtain information from a subject who is represented by counsel or planning a legal defense, the CHS must be advised not to interfere with an attorney/client relationship.\*  
 Yes  No  The Additional Instructions #2 field is required.
3. If the CHS is an employee of a financial institution, the CHS must be advised that he/she remains subject to the provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act and that the FBI will not knowingly accept information which violates the provisions of the Act.\*  
 Yes  No  The Additional Instructions #3 field is required.
4. If the CHS is an employee of an educational institution, the CHS must be advised that he/she remains subject to the provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (20 USC Sec. 1232g) known as the Buckley Amendment.\*  
 Yes  No  The Additional Instructions #4 field is required.
5. If the CHS is a union official of any rank charged with the duties and obligations under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 (29 USC) (i.e., having responsibilities related to retirement, benefits, or other income benefits of union members) he/she must be advised that he/she remains subject to reporting provisions of the ERISA. The CHS must not operate in a manner which adversely affects the operation of union affiliated pension, welfare, and benefit plans.\*  
 Yes  No  The Additional Instructions #5 field is required.

**CHS Admonishments**

Filing and Security\*

Previous

Administrative\*

Next

▶ Admonishments\*

Witness Information\*

Synopsis

Approval Routing\*

Review



**CHS Admonishments**

Filing and Security\*

Administrative\*

Admonishments\*

▶ **Witness Information\***

Synopsis

Approval Routing\*

Review

**Header**

**STEELE**  
4/17/2015

GAETA, MICHAEL J.  
International Operations  
Legat Rome

**Witness Information**

The content and meaning of the mandatory instructions and relevant additional instructions were conveyed to the CHS by the FBI Agent whose electronic signature appears below and were witnessed by the government official named below. The CHS acknowledged his/her receipt and understanding of these instructions.

Witness Name: \*

Ⓢ The Witness Name field is required.

Witness Title:

Witness Agency:

Previous

Next

*Provided verbally in person by ALAT Mike Gaeta on 1/25/16.*



*CHS*

*Gaeta 25/1/16.*



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(Effective 11-14-2016)

## Human Source Validation Report

HUMINT Operations Section, Validation Management Unit

Classified by: [REDACTED]  
Derived from: [REDACTED]  
Declassify on: [REDACTED]

### (U//FOUO) Human Source Validation Report: STEELE [REDACTED]

#### (U) Summary

(S//NF) Validation Management Unit (VMU) concurs with the closing of STEELE [REDACTED]. VMU assesses it is likely<sup>a</sup> STEELE [REDACTED] has contributed to the FBI's Criminal Program. VMU makes this assessment with medium confidence,<sup>b</sup> based on the fact that STEELE [REDACTED]'s reporting has been minimally corroborated; his or her access and placement is commensurate with his or her reporting; and on the presence of one major control issue noted in STEELE [REDACTED]'s Delta file. He or she provided information regarding various issues of value to the US Intelligence Community (USIC). However, STEELE [REDACTED] exposed his or her relationship with the FBI. As a result, he or she was closed. VMU has provided a list of recommendations should he or she be re-opened.

#### (U) Details

[REDACTED] This Human Source Validation Report (HSVR) conveys VMU's validation review and assessment of STEELE [REDACTED] for the period of 30 October 2013 to 01 November 2016.

[REDACTED] (Resides outside US and extra-territorial traveler)

Purpose of Review: Special Request

Primary Reporting Program: Criminal Investigation Division (CID)

Secondary Reporting Program: Counterintelligence Division (CD)

Field Office: Legal Attaché (LEGAT) Rome (RO)

<sup>a</sup> (U) See Appendix A (Expressions of Likelihood).

<sup>b</sup> (U) See Appendix B (Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information).

<sup>c</sup> (U) This validation review includes a check of the following databases: Delta, Sentinel, TECS, Automated Case Support (ACS), OGA [REDACTED] and Data Integration and Visualization System (DIVS), Counterintelligence and HUMINT Requirements Reporting Operations Management Environment (CHROME), and OGA [REDACTED]. VMU conducted database checks on 09 February 2017.

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#### (U) Administrative

(U//FOUO) Validation is a multi-layered process that may begin before meeting a potential CHS and may not end until sometime after the CHS relationship is terminated. As such, the collection of complete and current biographical data is critical to the accurate validation of the CHS. The Quarterly SSA Source Report (QSSR) ensures the CHS is properly managed; the Field Office Annual Source Report (FOASR) is designed to be the annual review of the CHS by the Special Agent and the Field Office. The FBIHQ VMU CHS validation reviews are prioritized using high-risk characteristics outlined in the Confidential Human Source Policy Guide (CHSPG) and the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
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Confidential Human Source Coordinator (CHSC): [REDACTED]  
Handling Agent: Michael J. Gaeta  
Date CHS was Opened/Closed: 30 October 2013; Closed 01 November 2016

**(U) Background**

[REDACTED] STEELE is a foreign national currently employed at his or her own business. FGI [REDACTED] He or she came to the attention of the FBI after being referred by the Department of Justice (DOJ). In the course of being operated, he or she provided information concerning the bribery scandal for the upcoming 2018 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and its proposed location in Russia, the pending United States (US) election concerning Donald Trump, potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) issues, and a cyber-attack from the People's Republic of China (PRC) on a foreign pharmaceutical company. STEELE [REDACTED] was closed on 01 November 2016 due to disclosing his or her relationship to an online publication website. This is the first HSVR completed on STEELE [REDACTED]

**(U) Suitability**

[REDACTED] VMU assesses it was likely STEELE [REDACTED] was suitable for continued operation at the time based on his or her authenticity and reliability. However, due to the disclosure of his or her relationship with the FBI to an online publication, STEELE [REDACTED] was subsequently closed.

**(U) Authenticity**

- [REDACTED] According to information contained in the Delta file, there are no reasons to doubt his or her identity. The ALAT has sufficiently verified STEELE [REDACTED] s identity through background investigations and updated criminal history checks during the operation.
- [REDACTED] VMU conducted a [REDACTED] on 09 February 2017 and verified the existence of STEELE [REDACTED] s privately owned company.
- [REDACTED] OGA [REDACTED]: According to the FOASR, STEELE [REDACTED] s access is listed as indirect. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] VMU notes STEELE [REDACTED] provided information through sub-sources. However, the identity of the sub-sources are not fully identified in the reporting. VMU notes should he or she be re-opened in the future, VMU recommends documenting all of the sub-sources' identities in the Delta file. The FOASR also mentions the sub-sources being motivated by money. VMU notes there is no mention if STEELE [REDACTED] is paying these sub-sources. VMU recommends the ALAT follow-up regarding this matter.
- [REDACTED] VMU was able to verify STEELE [REDACTED] s information on the selectors for the Russian doctor Mikhail KORIAGIN who is attempting to weaponize the Ebola virus.

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[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]  
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- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] VMU notes no motivation is documented in the FOASRs from the Delta file. However, the FO has updated the Delta file to include his or her motivation. VMU assesses monetary compensation to be a potential motivation for STEELE [REDACTED]. For the time of being operated, VMU notes STEELE [REDACTED] was paid \$7,000.00 in expenses and \$127,500.00 in payments. However, the closing EC documents paying STEELE [REDACTED] \$95,000.00. Should STEELE [REDACTED] be re-opened in the future, the ALAT is requested to resolve payments issues in the Delta file.

*(U) Reliability*

- [REDACTED] During STEELE [REDACTED]'s operation, VMU found no issues regarding his or her reliability.
- [REDACTED] VMU did not locate any information to suggest STEELE [REDACTED] fabricated information during the operation.

*(U) Control*

- [REDACTED] While being operated, VMU did not locate information indicating STEELE [REDACTED] was under the control of an outside entity. Furthermore, VMU noted no indication he or she would divulge their relationship with the FBI to the public.

**(U) Production Review/Investigative Support**

[REDACTED] VMU assesses it is likely STEELE [REDACTED] has informed the FBI across numerous programs. VMU makes this assessment with medium confidence, based on collection requirements addressed, IIRs produced, investigations supported, and minimal corroborated reporting.

- [REDACTED] Since being opened, STEELE [REDACTED]'s reporting resulted in the dissemination of 10 IIRs.
- [REDACTED] VMU notes due to STEELE [REDACTED]'s information in the FIFA scandal, it has resulted in four arrests, three convictions and agreed upon pleas of fraud. There was also pleas on bribery, structuring, tax evasion, fraud, and money laundering. Furthermore, there was approximately \$3.4 million dollars in forfeiture and an "additional unspecified amount of \$3 to \$4 million to be paid in satisfaction of tax debts by one of the defendants." (STEELE [REDACTED] Main-9-Payment EC).
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED] also notes the information disseminated in one IIR from STEELE [REDACTED] generated interest from an Other Government Agency (OGA) unit (STEELE [REDACTED] Main Serial# 33).

*(U) Corroboration*

- [REDACTED] According to the FOASR, STEELE [REDACTED] has been corroborated by other intelligence sources (NFI). An FBI HQ IA noted STEELE [REDACTED]'s information as

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[REDACTED]  
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“extremely valuable and informative” (STEELE [REDACTED] Main-8-Payment EC) with regards to Semion MOGILEVICH, an FBI Top Ten Fugitive.

- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] *Collection Requirements*

- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]

(U) *Threat Issues*

- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]

(U) *Key Intelligence Questions:*

- [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]

(U) **Compliance Issues**

[REDACTED] According to the Delta file, STEELE [REDACTED] brought an employee during debriefings. VMU notes there was no proper documentation regarding the disclosure of STEELE [REDACTED] s

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[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]  
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identity (A-13). According to the Confidential Human Source Policy Guide Section 15.2, SAC approval is required to disclose the identity of the CHS.

[REDACTED] Even though STEELE [REDACTED] resides outside the US, VMU notes there does need to be concurrence for him or her to travel internationally. VMU notes STEELE [REDACTED] traveled to Rome on 03 October 2016. OGA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**(U) Caveat**

(U [REDACTED]) There are no caveats regarding STEELE [REDACTED]

**(U) Analyst Comments**

[REDACTED] VMU notes as a result of the disclosure of his or her relationship to an online publishing company, STEELE [REDACTED] was closed. VMU notes the ALAT has addressed the following concerns in the Delta file to include STEELE [REDACTED]'s motivation and the reason behind divulging their relationship with the FBI to the public. Should the ALAT decide to re-open him or her, VMU has provided recommendations below. Furthermore, VMU notes difficulty in fully trusting him or her should they be re-opened in the future.

**(U) Recommendations**

[REDACTED] Should STEELE [REDACTED] be re-opened, VMU has provided a list of recommendations below.

[REDACTED] VMU notes STEELE [REDACTED] has provided much of his or her information through sub-sources. However, there is no documentation on the identities of all of the sub-sources. VMU notes sub-sources are individuals from whom FBI Sources obtain information. The Source, not the sub-source, reports the information directly to the handling agent. Sub-sources are not opened by the FO, are not operated at the direction of the FO, and therefore, cannot be controlled by the FBI. Additionally, they are not subject to the FBI's validation process, and their intelligence cannot necessarily be deemed reliable. Therefore, in order to prevent intelligence from being mistakenly disseminated within the Intelligence Community (IC) with the impression that it is derived from a reliable FBI Source, the information must be appropriately attributed to sub-source whose reliability is unknown. Source reporting must accurately describe the reliability of the information or its origin. As a result, the future handling agent of STEELE [REDACTED] should identify all sub-sources providing information reported by STEELE [REDACTED] and upload this into the Delta file. The ALAT should evaluate these sub-sources as potential Sources. VMU notes this will ensure the validity of the information being provided.

[REDACTED] VMU discourages the use of e-mail to pass sensitive information. VMU recommends the ALAT reference Section [REDACTED] for more information on policy requirements regarding communicating with STEELE [REDACTED]. VMU also recommends making copies of all e-mails received and to pass them to the ALAT for scanning and upload them into Delta.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED] VMU notes a lack of operational testing in the Delta file. Should STEELE [REDACTED] be re-opened in the future, VMU recommends consulting with the Validation Operational Testing Unit (VOTU) regarding operational testing and uploading the results to the Delta file.

[REDACTED] VMU recommends having STEELE [REDACTED] refrain from bringing outside individuals to future debriefings. Should the FBI ALAT encounter another individual at future debriefs, VMU recommends providing proper concurrence for disclosure of the Source's identity.

[REDACTED] Should there be future international travel for STEELE [REDACTED] VMU recommends consulting with HCC prior to STEELE [REDACTED] traveling.

[REDACTED] According to the [REDACTED] file, [REDACTED] notes potential information being provided to FBI through STEELE [REDACTED]'s privately owned company. As a result, [REDACTED] recommends consulting with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Should STEELE [REDACTED] be re-opened, VMU recommends documenting any future corroboration and motivation to the Delta file.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] recommends documenting if STEELE [REDACTED] has paid his or her sub-sources for the information provided.

**(U) Outlook**

[REDACTED] VMU assesses STEELE [REDACTED] has provided valuable information for the FBI and across the USIC regarding multiple issues. However, VMU notes a serious control issue be addressed before re-opening STEELE [REDACTED] VMU notes STEELE [REDACTED] exposed their relationship with the FBI and has brought an individual to debriefings without prior notification and approval. VMU assesses there is a potential obstacle for the FBI to fully trust in him or her to not divulge the relationship again. Furthermore, VMU notes while STEELE [REDACTED]'s access has been indirect through sub-sources, there does need to be an identification of them. VMU has provided several recommendations should he or she be re-opened.

**(U) Consumers:** [REDACTED]

**(U) From:** VMU

**(U) Drafted by:** [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

**(U) Case ID #:** [REDACTED]

**(U) Approval:** [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

**(U) Contact:** [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
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(U) This HSVR was prepared by VMU. Please address any comments or questions to [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] or to [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
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(U) Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood (or Probability)

(U) Phrases such as “the FBI judges” and “the FBI assesses,” and terms such as “likely” and “probably” convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart approximates how expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance.

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<i>Terms of Likelihood</i>	<b>Almost No Chance</b>	<b>Very Unlikely</b>	<b>Unlikely</b>	<b>Roughly Even Chance</b>	<b>Likely</b>	<b>Very Likely</b>	<b>Almost Certain(ly)</b>
<i>Terms of Probability</i>	<b>Remote</b>	<b>Highly Improbable</b>	<b>Improbable (Improbably)</b>	<b>Roughly Even Odds</b>	<b>Probable (Probably)</b>	<b>Highly Probable</b>	<b>Nearly Certain</b>
	<b>1-5%</b>	<b>5-20%</b>	<b>20-45%</b>	<b>45-55%</b>	<b>55-80%</b>	<b>80-95%</b>	<b>95-99%</b>

(U) Unless otherwise stated, the FBI does not derive judgments via statistical analysis.



**(U) Appendix B: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information**

(U) Confidence levels reflect the quality and quantity of the source information supporting judgment. Consequently, the FBI ascribes high, medium, or low levels of confidence to assessments, as follows:

(U) **High confidence** generally indicates the FBI's judgments are based on high quality information, from multiple sources. High confidence in a judgment does not imply the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such judgments might be wrong. While additional reporting and information sources may change analytical judgments, such changes are most likely to be refinements and not substantial in nature.

(U) **Medium confidence** generally means the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Additional reporting or information sources have the potential to increase the FBI's confidence levels or substantively change analytical judgments.

(U) **Low confidence** generally means the information's credibility or plausibility is uncertain, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or the reliability of the sources is questionable. Absent additional reporting or information sources, analytical judgments should be considered preliminary in nature.



## COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/080

### US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE DONALD TRUMP'S ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA AND COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KREMLIN

#### Summary

- Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and divisions in western alliance
- So far TRUMP has declined various sweetener real estate business deals offered him in Russia in order to further the Kremlin's cultivation of him. However he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals
- Former top Russian intelligence officer claims FSB has compromised TRUMP through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to blackmail him. According to several knowledgeable sources, his conduct in Moscow has included perverted sexual acts which have been arranged/monitored by the FSB
- A dossier of compromising material on Hillary CLINTON has been collated by the Russian Intelligence Services over many years and mainly comprises bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and intercepted phone calls rather than embarrassing conduct. This dossier is controlled by chief Kremlin spokesman, PESKOV, on direct orders from PUTIN. It has not been distributed abroad as yet, including to TRUMP team, but PUTIN's intentions for its use remain unclear

#### Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in June 2016 sources A and B, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry figure and a former top-level Russian intelligence officer still active inside the Kremlin respectively, the Russian authorities had been cultivating and supporting US Republican presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP for at least 5 years. Source B asserted that the TRUMP operation was both supported and directed by Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. Its aim was to sow discord and



disunity both within the US itself, but more especially within the Transatlantic alliance which was viewed as inimical to Russia's interests. Source C, a senior Russian financial official said the TRUMP operation should be seen in terms of PUTIN's desire to return to Nineteenth Century 'Great Power' politics, anchored upon countries' interests rather than the ideals-based international order established after World War Two. S/he had overheard PUTIN talking in this way to close associates on several occasions.

2. In terms of specifics, Source A confided that the Kremlin had been feeding TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence on his opponents for several years (see more below). This was confirmed by Source D, a close associate of TRUMP who had organized and managed his recent trips to Moscow, and who reported, also in June 2016, that this Russian intelligence had been "very helpful". The Kremlin's cultivation operation on TRUMP also had comprised offering him various lucrative real estate development business deals in Russia, especially in relation to the ongoing 2018 World Cup soccer tournament. However, so far, for reasons unknown, TRUMP had not taken up any of these.
3. However, there were other aspects to TRUMP's engagement with the Russian authorities. One which had borne fruit for them was to exploit TRUMP's personal obsessions and sexual perversion in order to obtain suitable 'kompromat' (compromising material) on him. According to Source D, where s/he had been present, TRUMP's (perverted) conduct in Moscow included hiring the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel, where he knew President and Mrs OBAMA (whom he hated) had stayed on one of their official trips to Russia, and defiling the bed where they had slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a 'golden showers' (urination) show in front of him. The hotel was known to be under FSB control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms to record anything they wanted to.
4. The Moscow Ritz Carlton episode involving TRUMP reported above was confirmed by Source E, a senior (western) member of staff at the hotel, who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of it at the time and subsequently. S/he believed it had happened in 2013. Source E provided an introduction for a company ethnic Russian operative to Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when TRUMP had stayed there, who also confirmed the story. Speaking separately in June 2016, Source B (the former top-level Russian intelligence officer) asserted that TRUMP's unorthodox behavior in Russia over the years had provided the authorities there with enough embarrassing material on the now Republican presidential candidate to be able to blackmail him if they so wished.
5. Asked about the Kremlin's reported intelligence feed to TRUMP over recent years and rumours about a Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on Hillary CLINTON (being circulated), Source B confirmed the file's



[REDACTED]

existence. S/he confided in a trusted compatriot that it had been collated by Department K of the FSB for many years, dating back to her husband Bill's presidency, and comprised mainly eavesdropped conversations of various sorts rather than details/evidence of unorthodox or embarrassing behavior. Some of the conversations were from bugged comments CLINTON had made on her various trips to Russia and focused on things she had said which contradicted her current position on various issues. Others were most probably from phone intercepts.

6. Continuing on this theme, Source G, a senior Kremlin official, confided that the CLINTON dossier was controlled exclusively by senior Kremlin spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV, on the direct instructions of PUTIN himself. The dossier had not been made available, as yet, inter alia, to any foreigners, including TRUMP and his inner circle. However PUTIN's intentions with regard to the dossier and its future dissemination remained unclear.

**20 June 2016**

8/29/16

## COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/100

### RUSSIA/USA: GROWING BACKLASH IN KREMLIN TO DNC HACKING AND TRUMP SUPPORT OPERATIONS

#### Summary

- Head of PA IVANOV laments Russian intervention in US presidential election and black PR against CLINTON and the DNC. Vows not to supply intelligence to Kremlin PR operatives again. Advocates now sitting tight and denying everything
- Presidential spokesman PESKOV the main protagonist in Kremlin campaign to aid TRUMP and damage CLINTON. He is now scared and fears being made scapegoat by leadership for backlash in US. Problem compounded by his botched intervention in recent Turkish crisis
- Premier MEDVEDEV's office furious over DNC hacking and associated anti-Russian publicity. Want good relations with US and ability to travel there. Refusing to support or help cover up after PESKOV
- Talk now in Kremlin of TRUMP withdrawing from presidential race altogether, but this still largely wishful thinking by more liberal elements in Moscow

#### Detail

1. Speaking in early August 2016, two well-placed and established Kremlin sources outlined the divisions and backlash in Moscow arising from the leaking of Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mails and the wider pro-TRUMP operation being conducted in the US. Head of Presidential Administration, Sergei IVANOV, was angry at the recent turn of events. He believed the Kremlin "team" involved, led by presidential spokesman Dmitriy PESKOV, had gone too far in interfering in foreign affairs with their "elephant in a china shop black PR". IVANOV claimed always to have opposed the handling and exploitation of intelligence by this PR "team". Following the backlash against such foreign interference in US politics, IVANOV was advocating that the only sensible course of action now for the Russian leadership was to "sit tight and deny everything".
2. Continuing on this theme the source close to IVANOV reported that PESKOV now was "scared shitless" that he would be scapegoated by PUTIN and the Kremlin and held responsible for the backlash against Russian political interference in the US election. IVANOV was determined

to stop PESKOV playing an independent role in relation to the US going forward and the source fully expected the presidential spokesman now to lay low. PESKOV's position was not helped by a botched attempt by him also to interfere in the recent failed coup in Turkey from a government relations (GR) perspective (no further details).

3. The extent of disquiet and division within Moscow caused by the backlash against Russian interference in the US election was underlined by a second source, close to premier Dmitriy MEDVEDEV (DAM). S/he said the Russian prime minister and his colleagues wanted to have good relations with the US, regardless of who was in power there, and not least so as to be able to travel there in future, either officially or privately. They were openly refusing to cover up for PESKOV and others involved in the DNC/TRUMP operations or to support his counter-attack of allegations against the USG for its alleged hacking of the Russian government and state agencies.
4. According to the first source, close to IVANOV, there had been talk in the Kremlin of TRUMP being forced to withdraw from the presidential race altogether as a result of recent events, ostensibly on grounds of his psychological state and unsuitability for high office. This might not be so bad for Russia in the circumstances but in the view of the source, it remained largely wishful thinking on the part of those in the regime opposed to PESKOV and his "botched" operations, at least for the time being.

**5 August 2016**



8/29/16

[REDACTED]

**COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/095**

**RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER INDICATIONS OF EXTENSIVE CONSPIRACY BETWEEN TRUMP'S CAMPAIGN TEAM AND THE KREMLIN**

**Summary**

- Further evidence of extensive conspiracy between TRUMP's campaign team and Kremlin, sanctioned at highest levels and involving Russian diplomatic staff based in the US
- TRUMP associate admits Kremlin behind recent appearance of DNC e-mails on WikiLeaks, as means of maintaining plausible deniability
- Agreed exchange of information established in both directions. TRUMP's team using moles within DNC and hackers in the US as well as outside in Russia. PUTIN motivated by fear and hatred of Hillary CLINTON. Russians receiving intel from TRUMP's team on Russian oligarchs and their families in US
- Mechanism for transmitting this intelligence involves "pension" disbursements to Russian emigres living in US as cover, using consular officials in New York, DC and Miami
- Suggestion from source close to TRUMP and MANAFORT that Republican campaign team happy to have Russia as media bogeyman to mask more extensive corrupt business ties to China and other emerging countries

**Detail**

1. Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late July 2016, Source E, an ethnic Russian close associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, admitted that there was a well-developed conspiracy of co-operation between them and the Russian leadership. This was managed on the TRUMP side by the Republican candidate's campaign manager, Paul MANAFORT, who was using foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE, and others as intermediaries. The two sides had a mutual interest in defeating Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, whom President PUTIN apparently both hated and feared.
  2. Inter alia, Source E, acknowledged that the Russian regime had been behind the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages, emanating from the Democratic National Committee (DNC), to the WikiLeaks platform.
- [REDACTED]



The reason for using WikiLeaks was “plausible deniability” and the operation had been conducted with the full knowledge and support of TRUMP and senior members of his campaign team. In return the TRUMP team had agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign issue and to raise US/NATO defence commitments in the Baltics and Eastern Europe to deflect attention away from Ukraine, a priority for PUTIN who needed to cauterise the subject.

3. In the wider context of TRUMP campaign/Kremlin co-operation, Source E claimed that the intelligence network being used against CLINTON comprised three elements. Firstly there were agents/facilitators within the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian émigré and associated offensive cyber operators based in the US; and thirdly, state-sponsored cyber operatives working in Russia. All three elements had played an important role to date. On the mechanism for rewarding relevant assets based in the US, and effecting a two-way flow of intelligence and other useful information, Source E claimed that Russian diplomatic staff in key cities such as New York, Washington DC and Miami were using the émigré ‘pension’ distribution system as cover. The operation therefore depended on key people in the US Russian émigré community for its success. Tens of thousands of dollars were involved.
4. In terms of the intelligence flow from the TRUMP team to Russia, Source E reported that much of this concerned the activities of business oligarchs and their families’ activities and assets in the US, with which PUTIN and the Kremlin seemed preoccupied.
5. Commenting on the negative media publicity surrounding alleged Russian interference in the US election campaign in support of TRUMP, Source E said he understood that the Republican candidate and his team were relatively relaxed about this because it deflected media and the Democrats’ attention away from TRUMP’s business dealings in China and other emerging markets. Unlike in Russia, these were substantial and involved the payment of large bribes and kickbacks which, were they to become public, would be potentially very damaging to their campaign.
6. Finally, regarding TRUMP’s claimed minimal investment profile in Russia, a separate source with direct knowledge said this had not been for want of trying. TRUMP’s previous efforts had included exploring the real estate sector in St Petersburg as well as Moscow but in the end TRUMP had had to settle for the use of extensive sexual services there from local prostitutes rather than business success.





8/29/16

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/101

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: SENIOR KREMLIN FIGURE OUTLINES EVOLVING RUSSIAN TACTICS IN PRO-TRUMP, ANTI-CLINTON OPERATION

Summary

- Head of PA, IVANOV assesses Kremlin intervention in US presidential election and outlines leadership thinking on operational way forward
- No new leaks envisaged, as too politically risky, but rather further exploitation of (WikiLeaks) material already disseminated to exacerbate divisions
- Educated US youth to be targeted as protest (against CLINTON) and swing vote in attempt to turn them over to TRUMP
- Russian leadership, including PUTIN, celebrating perceived success to date in splitting US hawks and elite
- Kremlin engaging with several high profile US players, including STEIN, PAGE and (former DIA Director Michael Flynn), and funding their recent visits to Moscow

Details

1. Speaking in confidence to a close colleague in early August 2016, Head of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA), Sergei IVANOV, assessed the impact and results of Kremlin intervention in the US presidential election to date. Although most commentators believed that the Kremlin was behind the leaked DNC/CLINTON e-mails, this remained technically deniable. Therefore the Russians would not risk their position for the time being with new leaked material, even to a third party like WikiLeaks. Rather the tactics would be to spread rumours and misinformation about the content of what already had been leaked and make up new content.
2. Continuing on this theme, IVANOV said that the audience to be targeted by such operations was the educated youth in America as the PA assessed that there was still a chance they could be persuaded to vote for Republican candidate Donald TRUMP as a protest against the Washington establishment (in the form of Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON). The hope was that even if she won, as a result of this CLINTON in power would be bogged down in working for internal reconciliation in the US, rather than being able to focus on foreign policy which would damage Russia's interests. This also should give President PUTIN more room for manoeuvre in the run-up to Russia's own presidential election in 2018.
3. IVANOV reported that although the Kremlin had underestimated the strength of US media and liberal reaction to the DNC hack and TRUMP's links to Russia, PUTIN was generally satisfied with the progress of the anti-CLINTON operation to date. He recently had had a drink with PUTIN to mark this. In IVANOV's view, the US had tried to divide the Russian elite with sanctions but failed, whilst they, by contrast, had succeeded in splitting the US hawks inimical to Russia and the Washington elite more generally, half of whom had refused to endorse any presidential candidate as a result of Russian intervention.
4. Speaking separately, also in early August 2016, a Kremlin official involved in US relations commented on aspects of the Russian operation to date. Its goals had been threefold- asking sympathetic US actors how Moscow could help them; gathering relevant intelligence; and creating and disseminating compromising information ('kompromat'). This had involved the Kremlin supporting various US political figures, including funding indirectly their recent visits to Moscow. S/he named a delegation from Lyndon LAROCHE; presidential candidate Jill STEIN of the Green Party; TRUMP foreign policy adviser

Carter PAGE; and former DIA Director Michael Flynn, in this regard and as successful in terms of perceived outcomes.

**10 August 2016**

8/29/16

**COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/102**

**RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REACTION IN TRUMP CAMP TO RECENT NEGATIVE PUBLICITY ABOUT  
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE AND LIKELY RESULTING TACTICS GOING FORWARD**

**Summary**

- TRUMP campaign insider reports recent DNC e-mail leaks were aimed at switching SANDERS (protest) voters away from CLINTON and over to TRUMP
- Admits Republican campaign underestimated resulting negative reaction from US liberals, elite and media and forced to change course as result
- Need now to turn tables on CLINTON's use of PUTIN as bogeyman in election, although some resentment at Russian president's perceived attempt to undermine USG and system over and above swinging presidential election

**Detail**

1. Speaking in confidence on 9 August 2016, an ethnic Russian associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP discussed the reaction inside his camp, and revised tactics therein resulting from recent negative publicity concerning Moscow's clandestine involvement in the campaign. TRUMP's associate reported that the aim of leaking the DNC e-mails to WikiLeaks during the Democratic Convention had been to swing supporters of Bernie SANDERS away from Hillary CLINTON and across to TRUMP. These voters were perceived as activist and anti-status quo and anti-establishment and in that regard sharing many features with the TRUMP campaign, including a visceral dislike of Hillary CLINTON. This objective had been conceived and promoted, inter alia, by TRUMP's foreign policy adviser Carter PAGE who had discussed it directly with the ethnic Russian associate.
2. Continuing on this theme, the ethnic Russian associate of TRUMP assessed that the problem was that the TRUMP campaign had underestimated the strength of the negative reaction from liberals and especially the conservative elite to Russian interference. This was forcing a rethink and a likely change of tactics. The main objective in the short term was to check Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON's successful exploitation of the PUTIN as bogeyman/Russian interference story to tarnish TRUMP and bolster her own (patriotic) credentials. The TRUMP campaign was focusing on tapping into support in the American television media to achieve this, as they reckoned this resource had been underused by them to date.
3. However, TRUMP's associate also admitted that there was a fair amount of anger and resentment within the Republican candidate's team at what was perceived by PUTIN as going beyond the objective of weakening CLINTON and bolstering TRUMP, by attempting to exploit the situation to undermine the US government and democratic system more generally. It was unclear at present how this aspect of the situation would play out in the weeks to come.

**10 August 2016**



Sept 20, '16

[REDACTED]

**COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/111**

**RUSSIA/US: KREMLIN FALLOUT FROM MEDIA EXPOSURE OF MOSCOW'S INTERFERENCE IN THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN**

**Summary**

- Kremlin orders senior staff to remain silent in media and private on allegations of Russian interference in US presidential campaign
- Senior figure however confirms gist of allegations and reports IVANOV sacked as Head of Administration on account of giving PUTIN poor advice on issue. VAINO selected as his replacement partly because he was not involved in pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s
- Russians do have further 'kompromat' on CLINTON (e-mails) and considering disseminating it after Duma (legislative elections) in late September. Presidential spokesman PESKOV continues to lead on this
- However, equally important is Kremlin objective to shift policy consensus favourably to Russia in US post-OBAMA whoever wins. Both presidential candidates' opposition to TPP and TTIP viewed as a result in this respect
- Senior Russian diplomat withdrawn from Washington embassy on account of potential exposure in US presidential election operation/s

**Detail**

1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a senior member of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA) commented on the political fallout from recent western media revelations about Moscow's intervention, in favour of Donald TRUMP and against Hillary CLINTON, in the US presidential election. The PA official reported that the issue had become incredibly sensitive and that president PUTIN had issued direct orders that Kremlin and government insiders should not discuss it in public or even in private.
  2. Despite this, the PA official confirmed, from direct knowledge, that the gist of the allegations was true. PUTIN had been receiving conflicting advice on interfering from three separate and expert groups. On one side had been the Russian ambassador to the US, Sergei KISLYAK, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with an independent and informal network run by presidential foreign policy advisor, Yuri USHAKOV
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(KISLYAK's predecessor in Washington) who had urged caution and the potential negative impact on Russia from the operation/s. On the other side was former PA Head, Sergei IVANOV, backed by Russian Foreign Intelligence (SVR), who had advised PUTIN that the pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s would be both effective and plausibly deniable with little blowback. The first group/s had been proven right and this had been the catalyst in PUTIN's decision to sack IVANOV (unexpectedly) as PA Head in August. His successor, Anton VAINO, had been selected for the job partly because he had not been involved in the US presidential election operation/s.

3. Continuing on this theme, the senior PA official said the situation now was that the Kremlin had further 'kompromat' on candidate CLINTON and had been considering releasing this via "plausibly deniable" channels after the Duma (legislative) elections were out of the way in mid-September. There was however a growing train of thought and associated lobby, arguing that the Russians could still make candidate CLINTON look "weak and stupid" by provoking her into railing against PUTIN and Russia without the need to release more of her e-mails. Presidential Spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV remained a key figure in the operation, although any final decision on dissemination of further material would be taken by PUTIN himself.
4. The senior PA official also reported that a growing element in Moscow's intervention in the US presidential election campaign was the objective of shifting the US political consensus in Russia's perceived interests regardless of who won. It basically comprised of pushing candidate CLINTON away from President OBAMA's policies. The best example of this was that both candidates now openly opposed the draft trade agreements, TPP and TTIP, which were assessed by Moscow as detrimental to Russian interests. Other issues where the Kremlin was looking to shift the US policy consensus were Ukraine and Syria. Overall however, the presidential election was considered still to be too close to call.
5. Finally, speaking separately to the same compatriot, a senior Russian MFA official reported that as a prophylactic measure, a leading Russian diplomat, Mikhail KULAGIN, had been withdrawn from Washington at short notice because Moscow feared his heavy involvement in the US presidential election operation, including the so-called veterans' pensions ruse (reported previously), would be exposed in the media there. His replacement, Andrei BONDAREV however was clean in this regard.



**Company Comment**

The substance of what was reported by the senior Russian PA official in paras 1 and 2 above, including the reasons for Sergei IVANOV's dismissal, was corroborated independently by a former top level Russian intelligence officer and Kremlin insider, also in mid-September.

**14 September 2016**





## **COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/94**

### **RUSSIA: SECRET KREMLIN MEETINGS ATTENDED BY TRUMP ADVISOR, CARTER PAGE IN MOSCOW (JULY 2016)**

#### **Summary**

- TRUMP advisor Carter PAGE holds secret meetings in Moscow with SECHIN and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official, DIVYEKIN
- SECHIN raises issues of future bilateral US-Russia energy co-operation and associated lifting of western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. PAGE non-committal in response
- DIVEYKIN discusses release of Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on TRUMP's opponent, Hillary CLINTON, but also hints at Kremlin possession of such material on TRUMP

#### **Detail**

1. Speaking in July 2016, a Russian source close to Rosneft President, PUTIN close associate and US-sanctioned individual, Igor SECHIN, confided the details of a recent secret meeting between him and visiting Foreign Affairs Advisor to Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, Carter PAGE.
2. According to SECHIN's associate, the Rosneft President (CEO) had raised with PAGE the issues of future bilateral energy cooperation and prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related western sanctions against Russia. PAGE had reacted positively to this demarche by SECHIN but had been generally non-committal in response.
3. Speaking separately, also in July 2016, an official close to Presidential Administration Head, S. IVANOV, confided in a compatriot that a senior colleague in the Internal Political Department of the PA, DIVYEKIN (nfd) also had met secretly with PAGE on his recent visit. Their agenda had included DIVEYKIN raising a dossier of 'kompromat' the Kremlin possessed on TRUMP's Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON, and its possible release to the Republican's campaign team.
4. However, the Kremlin official close to S. IVANOV added that s/he believed DIVEYKIN also had hinted (or indicated more strongly) that the Russian leadership also had 'kompromat' on TRUMP which the latter should bear in mind in his dealings with them.

**19 July 2016**

## **COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/135**

### **RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF TRUMP LAWYER, COHEN IN CAMPAIGN'S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN**

#### **Summary**

- Kremlin insider outlines important role played by TRUMP's lawyer COHEN in secret liaison with Russian leadership
- COHEN engaged with Russians in trying to cover up scandal of MANAFORT and exposure of PAGE and meets Kremlin officials secretly in the EU in August in pursuit of this goal
- These secret contacts continue but are now farmed out to trusted agents in Kremlin-linked institutes so as to remain "plausibly deniable" for Russian regime
- Further confirmation that sacking of IVANOV and appointments of VAINO and KIRIYENKO linked to need to cover up Kremlin's TRUMP support operation

#### **Detail**

1. Speaking in confidence to a longstanding compatriot friend in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN, in the ongoing secret liaison relationship between the New York tycoon's campaign and the Russian leadership. COHEN's role had grown following the departure of Paul MANNAFORT as TRUMP's campaign manager in August 2016. Prior to that MANNAFORT had led for the TRUMP side.
2. According to the Kremlin insider, COHEN now was heavily engaged in a cover up and damage limitation operation in the attempt to prevent the full details of TRUMP's relationship with Russia being exposed. In pursuit of this aim, COHEN had met secretly with several Russian Presidential Administration (PA) Legal Department officials in an EU country in August 2016. The immediate issues had been to contain further scandals involving MANNAFORT's commercial and political role in Russia/Ukraine and to limit the damage arising from exposure of former TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE's secret meetings with Russian leadership figures in Moscow the previous month. The



overall objective had been to “to sweep it all under the carpet and make sure no connections could be fully established or proven”

3. Things had become even “hotter” since August on the TRUMP-Russia track. According to the Kremlin insider, this had meant that direct contact between the TRUMP team and Russia had been farmed out by the Kremlin to trusted agents of influence working in pro-government policy institutes like that of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence. COHEN however continued to lead for the TRUMP team.
4. Referring back to the (surprise) sacking of Sergei IVANOV as Head of PA in August 2016, his replacement by Anton VAINO and the appointment of former Russian premier Sergei KIRIYENKO to another senior position in the PA, the Kremlin insider repeated that this had been directly connected to the TRUMP support operation and the need to cover up now that it was being exposed by the USG and in the western media.

#### **Company Comment**

The Kremlin insider was unsure of the identities of the PA officials with whom COHEN met secretly in August, or the exact date/s and locations of the meeting/s. There were significant internal security barriers being erected in the PA as the TRUMP issue became more controversial and damaging. However s/he continued to try to obtain these.

**19 October 2016**

## COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/132

### RUSSIA. PUTIN NOW REGRETS US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION INFLUENCE OPERATION

#### Summary

- Top level Russian intelligence figure claims PUTIN now regrets operation to interfere in US presidential election
- PUTIN thought US political system similar to Russian one (corrupt) but now considers this was a big error

#### Detail

1. Speaking to a colleague in mid October 2016, a former top level Russian intelligence officer and current Kremlin advisor claimed that President PUTIN now regretted Moscow's operation to interfere in the US presidential election in favour of Republican candidate Donald TRUMP. The officer said the operation now clearly had backfired.
2. Continuing on this theme, the former top level intelligence officer opined that PUTIN's mistake had been to regard the US political system as more like Russia (corrupt) than something different and to think he understood it sufficiently well to interfere effectively. The Russian president now realised he had been wrong. The TRUMP influence operation had been one of his biggest mistakes.

#### Source Comment

The former top level former Russian intelligence officer was not explicit about from whom he had obtained the above information. However he had implied it was either directly from PUTIN himself or someone very close to him in the Kremlin.

13 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/130

RUSSIA: KREMLIN ASSESSMENT OF TRUMP AND RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Summary

- Buyer's remorse sets in with Kremlin over TRUMP support operation in US presidential election. Russian leadership disappointed that leaked e-mails on CLINTON have not had greater impact in campaign
- Russians have injected further anti-CLINTON material into the 'plausibly deniable' leaks pipeline which will continue to surface, but best material already in public domain
- PUTIN angry with senior officials who "overpromised" on TRUMP and further heads likely to roll as result. Foreign Minister LAVROV may be next
- TRUMP supported by Kremlin because seen as divisive, anti-establishment candidate who would shake up current international status quo in Russia's favor. Lead on TRUMP operation moved from Foreign Ministry to FSB and then to presidential administration where it now sits

Detail

1. Speaking separately in confidence to a trusted compatriot in early October 2016, a senior Russian leadership figure and a Foreign Ministry official reported on recent developments concerning the Kremlin's operation to support Republican candidate Donald TRUMP in the US presidential election. The senior leadership figure said that a degree of buyer's remorse was setting in among Russian leaders concerning TRUMP. PUTIN and his colleagues were surprised and disappointed that leaks of Democratic candidate, Hillary CLINTON's hacked e-mails had not had greater impact on the campaign.
2. Continuing on this theme, the senior leadership figure commented that a stream of further hacked CLINTON material already had been injected by the Kremlin into compliant western media outlets like Wikileaks, which remained at least "plausibly deniable", so the stream of these would continue through October and up to the election. However s/he understood that the best material the Russians had already was out and there were no real game-changers to come.
3. The Russian Foreign Ministry official, who had direct access to the TRUMP support operation, reported that PUTIN was angry at his subordinate's "over-promising" on the Republican presidential candidate, both in terms of his chances and reliability and being able to cover and/or contain the US backlash over Kremlin interference. More heads therefore were likely to roll, with the MFA the easiest target. Ironically, despite his consistent urging of caution on the issue, Foreign Minister LAVROV could be the next one to go.
4. Asked to explain why PUTIN and the Kremlin had launched such an aggressive TRUMP support operation in the first place, the MFA official said that Russia needed to upset the liberal international status quo, including on Ukraine-related sanctions, which was seriously

disadvantaging the country. TRUMP was viewed as divisive in disrupting the whole US political system; anti-Establishment; and a pragmatist with whom they could do business. As the TRUMP support operation had gained momentum, control of it had passed from the MFA to the FSB and then into the presidential administration where it remained, a reflection of its growing significance over time. There was still a view in the Kremlin that TRUMP would continue as a (divisive) political force even if he lost the presidency and may run for and be elected to another public office.

12 October 2016



## COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/134

### RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF KREMLIN LIAISON WITH TRUMP CAMPAIGN

#### Summary

- Close associate of SECHIN confirms his secret meeting in Moscow with Carter PAGE in July
- Substance included offer of large stake in Rosneft in return for lifting sanctions on Russia. PAGE confirms this is TRUMP's intention
- SECHIN continued to think TRUMP could win presidency up to 17 October. Now looking to reorientate his engagement with the US
- Kremlin insider highlights importance of TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN in covert relationship with Russia. COHEN's wife is of Russian descent and her father a leading property developer in Moscow

#### Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid October 2016, a close associate of Rosneft President and PUTIN ally Igor' SECHIN elaborated on the reported secret meeting between the latter and Carter PAGE, of US Republican presidential candidate's foreign policy team, in Moscow in July 2016. The secret meeting had been confirmed to him/her by a senior member of SECHIN's staff, in addition to by the Rosneft President himself. It took place on either 7 or 8 July, the same day or the one after Carter PAGE made a public speech to the Higher Economic School in Moscow.
2. In terms of the substance of their discussion, SECHIN's associate said that the Rosneft President was so keen to lift personal and corporate western sanctions imposed on the company, that he offered PAGE/TRUMP's associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent (privatised) stake in Rosneft in return. PAGE had expressed interest and confirmed that were TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted.
3. According to SECHIN's close associate, the Rosneft President had continued to believe that TRUMP could win the US presidency right up to 17 October, when he assessed this was no longer possible. SECHIN was keen to re-adapt accordingly and put feelers out to other business and political contacts in the US instead.
4. Speaking separately to the same compatriot in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider with direct access to the leadership confirmed that a key role in the secret TRUMP campaign/Kremlin relationship was being played by the Republican candidate's personal lawyer Michael COHEN. COHEN had a wife of Russian origin, whose father, Efim SHUSTERMAN, was a leading Moscow property developer.

#### Source Comment

5. SECHIN's associate opined that although PAGE had not stated it explicitly to SECHIN, he had clearly implied that in terms of his comment on TRUMP's intention to lift Russian sanctions if elected president, he was speaking with the Republican candidate's authority.

**Company Comment**

6. It appears that SHUSTERMAN has a country house (dacha) in the settlement of Barvikha, west of Moscow. This village is reserved for the residences of the top leadership and their close associates.

**18 October 2016**

## Company Note

We received this report from Jon WINER, US State Department on 18 October 2016. It is the second in this series we have seen. We consider it potentially significant and apologise in advance for its rough format. The sub-source, as we understand it, is a Turkish businessman with strong Russian, including FSB links. He is in touch with Cody SHEARER, a contact of Sydney BLUMENTHAL, a friend of the CLINTONS, who passed it to WINER. We have no means of verifying the source/s or information but note that some of the reporting is remarkably similar to our own, albeit from a completely different sourcing chain, and therefore could be important collateral, especially on the reported Ritz Carlton incident in 2013; TRUMP's compromise by the FSB (and knowledge of it); and subsequent Kremlin funding of the TRUMP campaign (through the AGALAROVs). We judge that WINER at least would be happy to discuss all this further with you.

19 October 2016

BEGINS

# FSB†Interview ≠ ≠

I†asked†my†FSB†®Federal†Security†Service©†sour  
ce†why†he  
was†talking†to†meÆ†He†responded†that†he†was†c  
oncerned  
about†the†behavior†of†the†“hotheads”†within†the†  
FSBÆ†The  
FSB”†successor†to†the†KGB’s†domestic†side”†he†sa  
id”†had  
been†involved†in†foreign†intelligence†gathering†fo  
r†a†long  
time ≠ ≠  
particularly†the†political†unitÆ†He†said†a†military  
†wing  
of†the†GRU†was†overseeing†hacking†operation†in†  
UÆSÆ



He noted that there is a division within the FSB which he is part of that thinks the existence of a "pervasive" and "sophisticated" intelligence operation focusing on pivotal US personalities is widely known<sup>a</sup> specifically the Donald Trump operation. He said the Trump operation was an "open secret" in Putin's government circles. The question among FSB employees he said is how far this should go. He described these operations as "utter madness." He said there are two elements as to why Americans should care about what the FSB is doing: 1. The Americans are being screwed around with by a foreign power. 2. By helping expose and embarrass Putin in regards to what he has done with Trump which has spiraled out of control might eventually improve relations between the U.S. and Russia<sup>a</sup> because what he has done is dangerous. He repeated that Trump



whom he described as a  
"delicate target" ≠ ≠ ≠  
was filmed twice in Moscow in  
November 2013 during the Ms. Universe pageant.  
Once in the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel  
and a second time at the Crocus shopping mall where the  
pageant was held. He said there is a special complex for  
distinguished guests in the Crocus complex with  
all the amenities including a pool. This complex is owned  
by the Agalarov family.  
He said he believes a copy of the sex videos is in  
Bulgaria, Israel and FSB political unit vaults in  
Moscow.  
Having seen the videos, he describes Trump's behavior as  
"very dark."  
He said  
"This guy has mental issues with women. He  
doesn't act normal. There is a lot of penetration  
of all forms of penetration. Gosh. He grabs her. He licks her  
and makes her lick him. He sticks his fingers up her  
ass. He is a psychopath. He likes to make the women scr

eam and  
hurt them.”  
From observing Trump for years in previous visits to  
Moscow, the FSB knew he had a weakness for women.  
But he said Trump’s behavior illustrated that he really did  
not like women.  
He said that he knew that Trump eventually learned that  
he had been flipped in a honeypot operation in Moscow.  
He was also filmed in St. Petersburg. He said Trump was  
furious when he learned what had happened. Many of the  
old Russian friends Trump used to collaborate with are  
no longer on good terms with.  
He repeated that the first FSB generated payments to  
Trump took place in Baku, at the presidential palace. The  
first one was for \$10 million, which Trump took personally.  
The next payment of \$30 million went to daughter Ivanka.  
The FSB money was originally passed through Aras  
Agalarov, the billionaire real estate mogul, who served as  
a liaison between Trump and Putin. Anar Mam

madov"  
son of Azerbaijan Transport Minister Ziya Mammadov"  
was also involved. The presidential palace was used  
because Aras Agalarov's son "Emin" who got Trump to  
perform in a music video" was married to Leyla Aliyeva"  
the glamorous daughter of Azerbaijani President Ilham  
Aliyev" among other reasons. Trump promised to  
of support  
President Aliyev politically ≠ ≠ ≠  
after he was delivered the  
\$10 million ≠ ≠  
and promised to organize a visit of  
congressmen to Baku. My FSB source asked me  
to look  
into the Trump congressional trip to Baku with  
some of  
congressmen from both political parties.

ENDS



## **COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/137**

### **RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN MOVE TO PROTECT EXPOSED TRUMP TEAM SECRET LIAISON FIGURE, DIVYEKIN**

#### **Summary**

- Former TRUMP foreign policy adviser PAGE's secret Kremlin contact, DIVYEKIN, moved from PA to a senior Duma position following his exposure in western media
- New position gives DIVYEKIN diplomatic immunity if he travels abroad, making it harder for the USG to detain or question him. Move assessed by Kremlin insider as unorthodox, unsignalled and therefore as part of Kremlin TRUMP support operation cover-up

#### **Detail**

1. In mid October 2016, a mini-reshuffle of key staff took place in the Kremlin. As part of this reshuffle, the deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Internal Affairs department, Igor' DIVYEKIN, was moved from this position to a new one as Charge D'Affaires at the state Duma (Russian legislature). This move followed DIVYEKIN, a previously low key but senior Russian official, being exposed in the western media e.g. the Yahoo News story of September 23 2016 as a secret interlocutor of Carter PAGE, the then foreign policy advisor of the Republican US presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP.
2. Commenting on this move to a trusted friend and compatriot after the event in late October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted that DIVYEKIN's move was highly unusual. It did not form part of a wider rotation of staff; had not been prompted by a promotion or gazetted; and DIVYEKIN was not obviously qualified for the job, which required him to have both formal diplomatic skills and knowledge of legislative procedures. The new Duma position however gave him diplomatic immunity, at least in the Russian government's eyes, making it more difficult for the USG or other foreign governments to detain or question DIVYEKIN were he to travel abroad. The Kremlin insider compared the DIVYEKIN move to the manoeuvring of chief Aleksandr LITVINENKO murder suspect, Andrei LUGOVOY, into the Duma as a deputy after he had been exposed as a conspirator by the western media in 2007. LUGOVOY's position also gave him diplomatic immunity.

**24 October 2016**



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
 QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE  
**Date:** 07/15/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** MICHAEL J GAETA  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome  
**Classified By:** [REDACTED]  
**Derived From:** [REDACTED]  
**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]

**PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT**

**From:** 01/23/2016  
**To:** 04/22/2016

**OPENING/REOPENING**

**Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached?** Yes

**Date of Record Checks**

01/01/2016

**Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?** Yes

**Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?** Yes

**Initial Admonishment Date:** 12/10/2013

**Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)** Yes

**SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES**

**Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?** No

**SENSITIVE CATEGORIES**

**Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?** No

**SECTION I CERTIFICATION**

**I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 04/22/2016** Yes



FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT
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**Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:**

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via [REDACTED] (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

## OPERATIONAL MATTERS

Date of Last Reporting: 03/03/2016

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period? No

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No

Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this review period? Yes

Date of Approval: 03/13/2015

Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period? No

## SECTION II CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 04/22/2016 Yes

**Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:**

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via [REDACTED] (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

## PAYMENT MATTERS

**Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)**

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Serial
03/03/2016	0.0000	0.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE CE-012

**Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)**

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
03/03/2016	15000.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE CE-013
03/03/2016	5500.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE CE-012

**AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments**

Serialized Date	Serial





No data provided.

- If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file?** N/A
- Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained and retained in the CHS file?** N/A
- Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI special agent or government official?** N/A
- Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, which is maintained in the CHS's file.** N/A
- Have all payments been reconciled?** Yes

**SECTION III CERTIFICATION**

**I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of 04/22/2016** Yes

**Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:**

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via Delta (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

**ADMINISTRATION**

- Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel and documented in the CHS file?** N/A
- Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)?** No
- Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO or state or local prosecutor's office?** No
- Has the CHS previously testified?** No
- Is the CHS expected to testify?** No
- Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings?** No
- Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?** No
- Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?** No
- Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application?** No
- Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and ELSUR?** N/A
- Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file?** Yes
  - Last Admonishments      09/12/2013
  - Date:
- Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC?** N/A
- If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ?** N/A
- Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current?** Yes

**SECTION IV CERTIFICATION**



I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 04/22/2016 Yes

**Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:**

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via Delta (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

**CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM**

Stat Type	Total Count
Activities Observed/Detected by CHS	1
Disseminations Based on CHS Information	1

Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements? Yes

Productivity Value: [Redacted]

Access: [Redacted]

Access Value: [Redacted]

CHS Utility Value: [Redacted]

**CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM**

Score: [Redacted]

**COMMENTS**

**Comments/Instructions:**

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via [Redacted] (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

**Workflow History**




**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE  
**Date:** 08/23/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** MICHAEL J GAETA  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome  
**Classified By:** [REDACTED]  
**Derived From:** [REDACTED]  
**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]

**PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT**

**From:** 04/23/2016  
**To:** 07/22/2016

**OPENING/REOPENING**

**Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached?** Yes

<b>Date of Record Checks</b>
03/13/2015

**Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?** Yes

**Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?** Yes

**Initial Admonishment Date:** 12/10/2013

**Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)** Yes

**SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES**

**Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?** No

**SENSITIVE CATEGORIES**

**Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?** No

**SECTION I CERTIFICATION**

**I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016** Yes

**Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:**

**OPERATIONAL MATTERS**




FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT
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Date of Last Reporting: 07/08/2016

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period? No

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No

Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this review period? Yes

Date of Approval: 03/13/2015

Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period? No

**SECTION II CERTIFICATION**

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:

**PAYMENT MATTERS**

Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Serial
<i>No data provided.</i>				

Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
07/21/2016	6000.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE [REDACTED] CE-017
05/05/2016	1500.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE [REDACTED] CE-015

AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments

Serialized Date	Serial
<i>No data provided.</i>	

If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file? N/A

Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained and retained in the CHS file? N/A

Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI special agent or government official? Yes





FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT
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**Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, which is maintained in the CHS's file.** Yes

**Have all payments been reconciled?** Yes

<b>SECTION III CERTIFICATION</b>
----------------------------------

**I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016** Yes

**Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:**

<b>ADMINISTRATION</b>
-----------------------

**Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel and documented in the CHS file?** N/A

**Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)?** No

**Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO or state or local prosecutor's office?** No

**Has the CHS previously testified?** No

**Is the CHS expected to testify?** No

**Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings?** No

**Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?** No

**Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?** No

**Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application?** No

**Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and ELSUR?** N/A

**Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file?** Yes

Last Admonishments      02/02/2016  
Date:

**Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC?** N/A

**If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ?** N/A

**Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current?** Yes

<b>SECTION IV CERTIFICATION</b>
---------------------------------

**I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016** Yes

**Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:**

<b>CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM</b>
---------------------------------

Stat Type	Total Count
Activities Observed/Detected by CHS	4

**Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements?** Yes

**Productivity Value:**





FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT
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**Access:** █



**Access Value:** █

**CHS Utility Value:** █

**CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM**

**Score:** █

**COMMENTS**

**Comments/Instructions:**

CHS operation to continue.

**Workflow History**





FD-1040a

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
 STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/19/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

**Substantive Case File Number:** 97F-HQ-2063661  
**Stat Count:** 1  
**Category:** Countries  
**Sub Category:** Russia  
**Stat Type:** Identification(s) and Locate(s)  
**Sub Stat Type:** FIS Technique  
**Agency:** FBI  
**Stat:** FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

**Other Comments:**
**Total stat count claimed on this form: 1**
**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
 First Level Approved By  
 Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a

Page 1 of 1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

<b>FD-1040a</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/18/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

**Substantive Case File Number:** 97F-HQ-2063661  
**Stat Count:** 2  
**Category:** Countries  
**Sub Category:** Russia  
**Stat Type:** Identification(s) and Locate(s)  
**Sub Stat Type:** FIS Technique  
**Agency:** FBI  
**Stat:** FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

**Substantive Case File Number:** 97F-HQ-2063661  
**Stat Count:** 3  
**Category:** Countries  
**Sub Category:** Russia  
**Stat Type:** Activities Observed/Detected by CHS  
**Sub Stat Type:** Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Activity  
**Agency:** N/A  
**Stat:** FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE

**Other Comments:**

NA

**Total stat count claimed on this form: 5**

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
 First Level Approved By  
 Second Level Approved By

<b>FD-1040a</b>	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

## HEADER

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/21/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

## STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

FD-1040a

Page 1 of 3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

<b>FD-1040a</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
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**Substantive Case File Number:** 97F-HQ-2063661  
**Stat Count:** 1  
**Category:** Countries  
**Sub Category:** Russia  
**Stat Type:** Identification(s) and Locate(s)  
**Sub Stat Type:** FIS Agent/Asset  
**Agency:** FBI  
**Stat:** NO. FIS AGENT/ASSET IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

**Substantive Case File Number:** 97F-HQ-2063661  
**Stat Count:** 1  
**Category:** Countries  
**Sub Category:** Russia  
**Stat Type:** Identification(s) and Locate(s)  
**Sub Stat Type:** FIS Front Cover Organization  
**Agency:** FBI  
**Stat:** FIS FRONT COVER IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

**Substantive Case File Number:** 97F-HQ-2063661  
**Stat Count:** 1  
**Category:** Countries  
**Sub Category:** Russia  
**Stat Type:** Identification(s) and Locate(s)  
**Sub Stat Type:** FIS Technique  
**Agency:** FBI  
**Stat:** FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

**Substantive Case File Number:** 97F-HQ-2063661  
**Stat Count:** 1  
**Category:** Countries  
**Sub Category:** Russia  
**Stat Type:** Disseminations Based on CHS Information  
**Sub Stat Type:** Counter Intelligence Information  
**Agency:** FBI  
**Stat:** DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI



FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Other Comments:

Total stat count claimed on this form: 4

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
 STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10/24/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

**Substantive Case File Number:** 97F-HQ-2063661  
**Stat Count:** 1  
**Category:** Countries  
**Sub Category:** Russia  
**Stat Type:** Identification(s) and Locate(s)  
**Sub Stat Type:** FIS Technique  
**Agency:** FBI  
**Stat:** FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI  
**Substantive Case File Number:** 97F-HQ-2063661  
**Stat Count:** 1  
**Category:** Countries  
**Sub Category:** Russia  
**Stat Type:** Disseminations Based on CHS Information  
**Sub Stat Type:** Counter Intelligence Information  
**Agency:** FBI  
**Stat:** DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI

**Other Comments:**
**Total stat count claimed on this form: 2**
**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
 First Level Approved By  
 Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a

Page 1 of 1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
 QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE  
**Date:** 11/16/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** MICHAEL J GAETA  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome  
**Classified By:** [REDACTED]  
**Derived From:** [REDACTED]  
**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]

**PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT**

**From:** 07/23/2016  
**To:** 10/21/2016

**OPENING/REOPENING**

**Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached?** Yes

**Date of Record Checks**

03/13/2015

**Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?** Yes

**Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?** Yes

**Initial Admonishment Date:** 12/10/2013

**Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)** Yes

**SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES**

**Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?** No

**SENSITIVE CATEGORIES**

**Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?** No

**SECTION I CERTIFICATION**

**I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 10/21/2016** Yes

**Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:**

**OPERATIONAL MATTERS**



FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT
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Date of Last Reporting: 10/19/2016

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period? No

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? Yes

Has the CHS Travel Authorization form been completed and have the appropriate LEGAT(s) been notified? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No

Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this review period? Yes

Date of Approval: 03/13/2015

Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period? No

**SECTION II CERTIFICATION**

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 10/21/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:  
Pursuant to CHS being based overseas, personal international travel is not accounted for.

**PAYMENT MATTERS**

Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Serial
<i>No data provided.</i>				

Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
10/19/2016	15000.0000	97F-HQ-2063661	STEELE [REDACTED] CE-020
10/13/2016	7500.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE [REDACTED] CE-019

AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments

Serialized Date	Serial
<i>No data provided.</i>	

If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file? N/A

Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained and retained in the CHS file? N/A





FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT
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**Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI special agent or government official?** Yes

**Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, which is maintained in the CHS's file.** Yes

**Have all payments been reconciled?** Yes

<b>SECTION III CERTIFICATION</b>
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**I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of 10/21/2016** Yes

**Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:**

Pending payment amounts will not be provided to CHS pursuant to specific issues being addressed by FBIHQ and Legat Rome.

<b>ADMINISTRATION</b>
-----------------------

**Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel and documented in the CHS file?** No

**Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)?** No

**Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO or state or local prosecutor's office?** No

**Has the CHS previously testified?** No

**Is the CHS expected to testify?** No

**Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings?** No

**Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?** No

**Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?** No

**Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application?** No

**Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and ELSUR?** N/A

**Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file?** Yes

Last Admonishments      09/12/2013  
Date:

**Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC?** N/A

**If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ?** N/A

**Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current?** Yes

<b>SECTION IV CERTIFICATION</b>
---------------------------------

**I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 10/21/2016** Yes

**Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:**

CHS recently self-disclosed relationship to media and as a result, closure has been directed by FBIHQ.

<b>CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM</b>
---------------------------------

Stat Type	Total Count
Identification(s) and Locate(s)	2







<b>FD-1040a</b>	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT
-----------------	---

Activities Observed/Detected by CHS	3
Identification(s) and Locate(s)	1

**Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements?** Yes

**Productivity Value:** ■

**Access:** ■

**Access Value:** ■

**CHS Utility Value:** ■

<b>CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM</b>
----------------------------------

**Score:** ■

<b>COMMENTS</b>
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**Comments/Instructions:**  
 CHS' recent self-disclosure to the media and resulting media reporting will result in CHS closure. There has been no contact with CHS since closure order by AD IOD and AD CD. Closure will be completed upon completion of this QSSR and pending FOASR.

**Workflow History**



FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT
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**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 11/17/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**ADMINISTRATIVE**

**Legacy Case File Number:**  
**Legacy Symbol Number:**  
**Co-Case Agent(s):** [REDACTED]  
**From:** 10/31/2015  
**To:** 10/30/2016  
**Date of Last FOASR:**  
**Gender:** Male  
**SSN:**  
**Alias SSN(s):**  
**DOB:** [REDACTED]  
**Alias DOB(s):**  
**Country(ies) of Citizenship:**  
**Does the CHS live in, or is he/she operated in the United States?** False

Alien Status	Registration Number	Issued Date	Expiration Date
<i>No data provided.</i>			

**Race:**

Ethnicity, Nationality, and Tribal Affiliations
UK

**Language(s) Spoken:**

**Primary language used during debriefing, if a translator was used, and frequency of use:**  
English

**Prior operational periods of the CHS by the FBI (start with the most recent).**

**Opened:** 10/30/2013

**Closed:**

**Programs to which the CHS has contributed during the review period.**

FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT
----------	---

HQ Division	Program	Subprogram	Primary?
Criminal Investigative Division	TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM	EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES	Yes
Counterintelligence Division	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE	No
Criminal Investigative Division	COMPLEX FINANCIAL CRIME PROGRAM	MONEY LAUNDERING	No
Criminal Investigative Division	COMPLEX FINANCIAL CRIME PROGRAM	OTHER MATTERS - CFC	No
Criminal Investigative Division	COMPLEX FINANCIAL CRIME PROGRAM	MONEY LAUNDERING	No

Has any of the CHS's information been provided to an AUSA or DOJ attorney during the review period, for use in furtherance of a prosecution or in a court document? No

#### CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Highly paid – review period (> \$100,000 in the review period). No

*Amount paid includes payments from CHS funds, case funds, other agencies (if known, etc.)*

**Amount Paid During Review Period:** \$0.00

**Amount Paid During Review Period (non-FBI money):** \$0.00

Highly paid – cumulative (>= \$250,000 over entire CHS operation). No

*Amount paid includes payments from CHS funds, case funds, other agencies (if known, etc.).*

**Cumulative Amount Paid:** \$74,000.00

**Cumulative Amount Paid (non-FBI money):** \$0.00

If funds other than those calculated above were used, please provide details.

Defector. No

Recruitment-in-Place or Double Agent. No

Are there reasonable grounds to believe the CHS engaged in Unauthorized Illegal Activity (UIA), other than minor traffic offenses per CHSPG, within the review period? No

CHS who resides outside the United States. Yes

Please provide details (city, state/region, country, etc):

CHS resides in the United Kingdom. Legat London is fully aware and concurs.

Any international travel during the review period? Yes

Travel Start Date	Travel End Date	Countries	Travel Type
No data provided.			

**FD-1040a** **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT

**Please provide any additional details, including type and frequency of travel:**  
CHS traveled to Rome Italy on October 3 to meet with handling agent and FBI reps from HQ - CI/CD.

**Former or current subject of FBI investigation(s).** No

**CHS subjected to polygraph with inconclusive and/or deceptive results at any time.** No

**CHS who was ever Closed for Cause by the FBI or any other agency. (Note: Other agencies may not refer to this closure as such; however, if another agency closed the CHS for one of the below reasons, it would be considered as closing for Cause.)** No

**CHS who has ever received immigration benefits from the FBI and/or the USIC for him/her and/or his/her family.** No

**Score:** [REDACTED]

**SPECIAL CRITERIA**

**Long-Term CHS (5+ consecutive years).** No

**Is the CHS a Criminal and/or National Security CHS?** No

**Has the CHS been operated by the same Case Agent for 5+ years?** No

**Senior Leadership CHS – CHS who is in a position to exercise significant decision-making authority over, or to otherwise manage and direct the unlawful activities of the participants in a group or organization involved with unlawful activities that are nationwide or international in scope or deemed to be of high significance to the FBI’s criminal investigative priorities, even if the unlawful activities are local or regional in scope.** No

**High-Level Government or Union CHS– CHS is either (a) the chief executive, the office next in succession to the chief executive, or a member of the legislature of the federal or a state government, or (b) a president, secretary-treasurer, or vice-president of an international labor union or the principal officer or officers of a subordinate regional entity of an international or national labor union.** No

**Privileged (Attorney, Physician, or Clergy) and/or Media CHS.** No

**CHS involved in Group I and/or Group II Undercover Operation (UCO) and/or Asset Business Enterprise during the review period.** No

**CHS participated in Tier I and/or Tier II Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) within the review period. Do not check if OIA is solely for consensual monitoring in two-party states.** No

**Within the review period, was the CHS involved in an operation using sophisticated techniques, other than Tier I/II OIA, Group I/II UCO, or Asset Business Enterprise activities?** No

**Opened three or more times.** No

**CHS subjected to Level 1 and/or Level 2 Operational Test at any time.** No

**Have ANY intelligence products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) been generated as a result of the CHS’s reporting?** Yes

**CHS with 3+ intelligence products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) and/or 2+ intelligence products which led to investigative action or contained singular information (within review period)** Yes

**Please provide the number of products, type of products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) and identifying number(s) and name(s) of products.**

FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT
----------	---

Product Type	Title	Number (case file, serial, product number, etc)	Product Date
<i>No data provided.</i>			

**CHS responsible for recruitment of another CHS.** No

Please provide S number(s) of CHS(s) recruited and S number(s) of any other CHSs affiliated with the CHS. Please describe the nature of the relationship(s) between the CHS and the CHS(s) recruited CHS(s) with whom the CHS is affiliated:

**Is the CHS a former or current jointly operated CHS?** No

**Has the CHS ever met with, been debriefed by, or been operated by another agency on separate matters?** No

**Has the CHS ever been affiliated with a foreign intelligence service, known terrorist group, or criminal organization?** [REDACTED]

Provide details:

FGI [REDACTED]

**How did the CHS come to the attention of the FBI?**

Brought to the FBI by a non-FBI agency

**If the CHS was brought to the FBI by a non-DBI member, name the agency that brought the CHS.**

**Agency Name:**

Agency Name: DOJ

**Is the CHS being utilized jointly with another FBI Field Office/Field Division?** No

**Has the CHS or his/her associates (e.g., relatives, former employees, etc.) ever had any other affiliations with another agency?** [REDACTED]

Please provide details:

FGI [REDACTED]

**Has the CHS been the subject of U.S. and/or foreign legal proceedings (e.g. arrested, cited, or detained for any reason)?** No

Source of Income, Amount and Frequency (e.g. Monthly)
<i>No data provided.</i>

Asset and Value
<i>No data provided.</i>

Debt and Amount
<i>No data provided.</i>

**HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE FBI**

Name	Role	Field Office/Division	Date Assigned	Date Removed
[REDACTED]	Co-Case Agent	International Operations	04/15/2016	



UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT			
[REDACTED]	Co-Case Agent	Philadelphia	04/29/2016	
[REDACTED]	Case Agent	New York	10/24/2013	07/22/2014
Gaeta, Michael J	Case Agent	International Operations	07/22/2014	

**Explain reason for change in primary handlers, if within review period, and if known:**

CHS was transferred to ALAT Gaeta upon beginning new position at [REDACTED]

**Problems encountered during review period either meeting or handling the CHS:**

On October 3, 2016, CHS was tasked by FBIHQ CI/CD representatives to obtain and provide espionage related intelligence in support of 97F-HQ-2063661. CHS was specifically instructed not supply this intelligence to any other party. CHS was advised that in exchange for this intelligence and agreement, FBI CI/CD would compensate the CHS. On November 1, 2016, an article in MotherJones.com was published highlighting the provision of this intelligence to the FBI. Handling agent asked the CHS if CHS was the source of the article's information to which the CHS replied "yes." As such, the CHS is being closed.

**MOTIVATION**

**Describe the CHS's motivations for providing information to the FBI and how this was determined:**

**Have the CHS's motivations changed during the review period?** No

**PAYMENTS**

**Total Payments for Reporting Period**

**By FBI:** \$0.00

**By Other Agencies:** \$0.00

**Lifetime Aggregate Payments**

**By FBI:** \$74,000.00

**By Other Agencies:** \$0.00

**During the review period, was the CHS ever paid without another FBI special agent or government official present?** No

**Was SAC authorization obtained and documented?**

**Identify any benefits the CHS received during the period other than money not already covered by question III-A (e.g., sentencing benefits or immigration benefits)**

THE CHS REPORT RE \$ PAID IS INCORRECT. AS FULLY DOCUMENTED IN THE CHS FILE, THE CHS HAS BEEN PAID AN AGGREGATE TOTAL OF \$95,000 SINCE OPENING IN OCTOBER 2013. AS EVIDENCED AND FULLY DOCUMENTED IN THE CHS FILE CHS WAS PAID \$21,000 DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD.

**Describe any instance in which the CHS requested special favors, consideration, or treatment, including, but not limited to**

1. Assistance for the CHS's family members
2. Intervention by the FBI in business, employment, or civil matters

NA

**REPORTING**

**Substantive Case File Number:** [REDACTED] 97F-HQ-2063661, [REDACTED]

**Below are stats claimed during the review period relevant to validation:**

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT
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Stat	Reporting Document
FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE	STEELE [REDACTED] V-048.pdf
DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI	STEELE [REDACTED] V-050.pdf
FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE	STEELE [REDACTED] V-036.pdf
FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE	STEELE [REDACTED] V-040.pdf
FIS FRONT COVER IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE [REDACTED] V-050.pdf
FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE [REDACTED] V-046.pdf
FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE [REDACTED] V-050.pdf
FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE [REDACTED] V-048.pdf
DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI	STEELE [REDACTED] V-052.pdf
FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE [REDACTED] V-052.pdf
NO. FIS AGENT/ASSET IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE [REDACTED] V-050.pdf
DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CRIM; FBI	STEELE [REDACTED] V-032.pdf

**TIMELINESS OF INFORMATION**

**Describe whether the CHS's information was provided promptly and consistently with the CHS's access; whether the CHS reporting was delayed; or whether the information was historical in nature.**

CHS provided reporting as obtained. CHS has sub-sources, some of whom are out of contact for periods of time.

**ACCESS**

**The CHS's access is:** Indirect

**Describe the CHS's access to information:**  
Unknown

**Is the information obtained through a sub-source?** Yes

**Describe the relationship between the CHS and the sub-source:**  
CHS has had long-standing relationships with sub-sources.

**Describe the sub-source's access and motivation:**  
Sub-sources motivations are primarily money.

**Describe actions taken, if any, to independently confirm the sub-source exists and has logical access to the information claimed. If none, explain.**  
Some of CHS' sub sources have been identified. The sub-sources reside in areas where the Bureau can not operate freely. FBI HQ CI/CD has worked to verify the known sub-sources and their information.

**Is the identity of the sub-source known?** No

**Is the sub-source aware that the CHS is providing information to the FBI?** No

**Is the sub-source a member of a hostile intelligence service or a member of a terrorist or criminal organization?** No

**Describe any significant changes during the review period of the CHS's targets or the CHS's access to information:**  
NA

FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT
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**CORROBORATION****Discuss instances in which the CHS's reporting was verified by circumstances or other intelligence:**

Some of CHS' info has been corroborated by other intel sources. The CHS intel is provided to analysts at HQ (CID) for review and assessment as compared to other intel. CHS was the original CHS who provided information regarding the FIFA investigation (281H-NY-305564) and identified others for contact to the case squad. As of this date (February 8, 2016) There have been over 30 individuals indicted and agreed upon forfeiture amounts of approximately \$170,000,000. CHS' intel provided for 97F-HQ-2063661 has been corroborated to an extent by other sources in that case.

**Discuss instances in which the CHS's reporting was not consistent with the facts and the impact of each reporting instance:**

NA

**RELIABILITY EVALUATION****Discuss any reason to doubt this CHS's identity:**

NA

**Cite Case Agent observations of the CHS's behavior:**

Professional. However, CHS acted unprofessionally in providing information to reporters for MotherJones.com.

**Discuss any handling problems including any instances in which the CHS objected to any operational tasking:**

CHS never objected to tasking.

**Describe any information not previously provided that could reasonably be construed as derogatory. This should include information from other CHS reporting, substantive case documents, other agency reporting, and statements made by the CHS. Ensure that all available information that might materially alter a prior validation assessment, including information pertaining to unauthorized illegal activity by the CHS is included.**

On October 3, 2016, CHS was tasked by FBIHQ CI/CD representatives to obtain and provide espionage related intelligence in support of 97F-HQ-2063661. CHS was specifically instructed not supply this intelligence to any other party. CHS was advised that in exchange for this intelligence and agreement, FBI CI/CD would compensate the CHS. On November 1, 2016, an article in MotherJones.com was published highlighting the provision of this intelligence to the FBI. Handling agent asked the CHS if CHS was the source of the article's information to which the CHS replied "yes." As such, the CHS is being closed.

**Describe any of the CHS's character traits, habits, or weaknesses that may impact the CHS's reporting**

CHS recent disclosure to MotherJones reporters.

**Describe any indications of undisclosed control by an entity or individual other than the FBI (e.g., counterintelligence concerns, criminal organization interests, etc).**

NA

**Is the CHS reasonably believed to be the subject or target of a pending criminal investigation, is under arrest, or has been charged in a pending prosecution?**

No

**Are current criminal history checks contained in the CHS's file?**

Yes

**Date of Record Checks**

11/17/2016

**Were any new references obtained from FBI database checks during this review period?**

No

**CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM**

FD-1040a	Page 7 of 8	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT		
<b>QSSR Period 1</b>	<b>QSSR Period 2</b>	<b>QSSR Period 3</b>	<b>QSSR Period 4</b>
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
10/24/2015 - 01/22/2016	01/23/2016 - 04/22/2016	04/23/2016 - 07/22/2016	07/23/2016 - 10/21/2016

Average CHS Utility Value = [REDACTED]

**COMMENTS**

**Author's Comments:**  
CHS will be closed

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By  
First Level Approved By  
Second Level Approved By

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

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**From:** MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (DO) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 12, 2017 9:30 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

-----Original Message-----

**From:** AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 04, 2016 5:12 AM  
**To:** PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI) <JPIENKA@[REDACTED]> MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) <JCMOFFA@[REDACTED]>  
STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI) <PPSTRZOK@[REDACTED]>  
**Cc:** GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI) <BEGESSFORD@[REDACTED]> SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI) <SMSOMMA@[REDACTED]>  
VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI) <MFVARACALLI@[REDACTED]> HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI) <CAHEIDE@[REDACTED]>  
[REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

This email string has now been classified [REDACTED].

All -- I wanted to attach a short write-up from yesterday's CHS meeting to this particular email string b/c it will reference some additional details re: sourcing, especially for CHS report numbers 2016-80, 2016-94, and 2016-95.

1. It would appear that the CHS has one major sub-source, who in turn meets with an assortment of individuals with direct and indirect knowledge and access. It appears that most, if not all, of the sub-source's contacts are unwitting of where their information is going. The CHS's sub-source travels in/out of target country, and appears to be well-connected.
2. The first time CHS debriefed his sub-source regarding the Trump material was 16 June [hence, the customer request for his company's services took place prior to 16 June]. CHS carried a notebook with him to the debriefing here, and he was able to reference the date. CHS's services were originally requested re: doing research and intelligence collection re: FURY's debts, and the DRAGON material, etc. was collected as a result of that.



3. In July 25 [2016-94], the source close to Sechin = Sechin's mistress. She is the one who reported re: DRAGON's secret meeting with "Igor Ivanovich [Sechin]"

4. In July 25 [2016-94], the source to the head of the Russian presidential administration is [REDACTED] related to CHS sub-source [REDACTED] office conversation where DRAGON's meeting with Diveykin was discussed.

5. CHS indicated that some of his sub-sources contacts had been "reporting" for a longer period than others; some of them were fairly new. [REDACTED]

6. In July 5 [2016-80], the "former top level Russian intelligence officer" = [REDACTED]

7. CHS's sub-source has had personal contact with Sergey Millian. Millian appears to be Source E in 2016-95 (and may also be Source D in 2016-80). Millian has had direct interaction with CHS's sub-source. CHS indicated that Millian told his sub-source that DRAGON "played monkey to [FURY's] organ grinder." Millian allegedly heard about FURY, DRAGON and the Russians "at campaign HQ." CHS added, however, that Millian is a "boaster" and an "egotist" and may engage in some embellishment. Millian has been involved in Trump's business dealings, as well as with business dealings for other Russians -- including Russian Duma members. CHS mentioned Millian's involvement in selling condos in Miami, and also said that Millian was involved in [REDACTED] [spelling -- see list of names/terms that came from NY source involving Trump and OC-type stuff] real estate deals.

8. CHS indicated that FURY owes 100 million dollars to a single creditor.

9. CHS had never heard TYPHOON's name. He had not come across TYPHOON's name in his research or reporting.

10. CHS gave a few other names which, he indicated, could be of interest. The first, Greg Hartley (sp), is connected with an outfit called Cloakroom Advisors. CHS described Hartley as a "Republican lobbyist." CHS was somewhat unclear, but there is some connection between Hartley and a pro-Trump and anti-HRC PR campaign financed by Russia [Kremlin]. This information apparently came from Millian, and there was also some connection between Hartley and a Dmitriy [Dmitry] Z [CHS couldn't remember the last name] with Novosti in the United States. [This needs follow-up by Gaeta]

11. There were two additional names of US-based individuals provided by CHS who may have information re: Russia/Trump: (1) Charles Doland (sp); and (2) Stephen/Steven Kupka (sp). Another name provided later by CHS re: USPER with knowledge of Russia/Trump was David Giovannis (sp).

12. CHS reiterated information from 2016-95, paragraph 4, re: quid pro quo and "two way flow" of information w/ Trump team -- specifically, collection of information vs. oligarchs and family/asset activity in the United States.

13. CHS suggested that Aras Agalarov -- Azeri businessman with close ties to Trump -- may be someone of interest re: information about Trump's Russian connections.

14. CHS added to FI of interest re: shifting within Russia's Presidential Administration. When discussing the removal of Sergey Ivanov as Chief of Staff and the ascension of Anton Vaino, CHS indicated that public blowback from the DNC/Trump operation was used as the "final straw" by Putin to remove Ivanov. It was CHS's understanding that Ivanov may have gone off the reservation re: Syrian matters -- CHS made an off-hand reference to the involvement of mercenaries/freelancers -- but as a whole, Ivanov was becoming "too big for himself." Vaino's elevation as Ivanov's replacement wasn't a direct consequence of the DNC/Trump operation, but Putin had a close relationship with Vaino and Vaino hadn't been involved in the DNC/Trump op. CHS reiterated that Dmitriy Peskov is very much involved in the DNC/Trump op.

15. CHS reported on an individual he identified as DRAGON's possible "handler" or "case agent" -- Igor Yatsenko. Yatsenko may have had a Gazprom connection and lives "in the West" -- possibly/presumably in London.

16. According to CHS, there is RUMINT that DRAGON has a Russian girlfriend -- a ballerina or opera singer of some sort. CHS did not have a name. CHS had never heard RUMINT that DRAGON was homosexual.

17. CHS provided another name of possible interest -- FNU Temeko. Temeko lives in the UK, and has some sort of former relationship with Yukos. He is close to former head of the FSB, Nikolay Patrushev. Temeko has "burrowed himself" into the UK Conservative Party and is a "British version of [Sergey] Millian." Temeko is connected to Boris Johnson, and is tied to Brexit issues. Temeko also has some type of relationship with US politicians.

Upon return, I will write this information up for Gaeta's source file.

Best,

Brian

-----Original Message-----

From: PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)

Sent: Monday, September 19, 2016 3:48 PM

To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: FW: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]  
=====

-----Original Message-----

From: GAETA, MICHAEL J. (RO) (FBI)

Sent: Monday, September 19, 2016 8:49 AM

To: PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)

Subject: FW: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]  
=====

Joe,

First two. I actually have 4 more that are more on point for you that I am sending in a few min.

Mike

-----Original Message-----

From: GAETA, MICHAEL J. (RO) (FBI)

Sent: Friday, August 05, 2016 5:10 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]  
=====

Until the EC.

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

**From:** [MOFFA, JONATHAN C. \(DO\) \(FBI\)](#)  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: Meeting with Crown in Rome 10/3 --- [REDACTED]  
**Date:** Wednesday, October 11, 2017 11:26:23 AM

---

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] G

---

TRANSITORY RECORD

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**From:** STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 04, 2016 10:05 AM  
**To:** MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: Meeting with Crown in Rome 10/3 --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

---

TRANSITORY RECORD

---

**From:** GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 04, 2016 5:13 AM  
**To:** PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI); GAETA, MICHAEL J. (RO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Meeting with Crown in Rome 10/3 --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

---

TRANSITORY RECORD

I will send a separate email with CHS ident. Auten took notes regarding specific CHS reporting and will send a sep email covering those notes.

Meeting occurred on 10/3/2016, offsite from USEMB, from approx 1500 to 1800. CHS had met with ALAT Gaeta prior (approx 1400) to meeting with Gessford, Varacelli, and Auten. ALAT Gaeta remained in meeting, also. ALAT advised that CHS volunteered his reporting relationship with USDOS in a previous conversation.

CHS was introduced to CH team and advised that his business partner was unable to attend meeting. FGI [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CHS advised that he runs a small, business/financial intelligence firm in London with his partner and a small number of staff. CHS advised that he uses an "agent handler" (SA Note: CHS continually referred to one handler, and upon further questioning, implied that he had several, but it appears that he has one primary handler who he continually referred to in this matter) who travels into Russia and interacts with a number of subsources (who are not witting) to gather his intelligence. He has a number of unnamed "clients" who he provides intelligence reports to and if he determines that there is information of interest to the USG, he provides duplicate copies of those reports to ALAT Gaeta for distribution and consumption within the FBI.

CHS continually made reference to the importance of confidentiality with his clients and subsources but advised that he knows of the importance of the information that predicated the meeting. CHS advised that his primary agent handler was currently inside Russia and that he would debrief him upon his return on Sunday, October 8, 2016. CHS mentioned that he was becoming increasingly fearful for the safety of his agent handler in Russia as he believed that his Russian sub sources are becoming increasingly reluctant to discuss the Trump-Russian relationship and this is increasingly becoming a closed topic for discussion. CHS also mentioned that it was very dangerous to identify his sub source network by name, as it was well know that that the USIC and "our agency" (the FBI) have had problems in the past with internal penetrations (CHS was advised that SA Gessford was very well versed with internal penetrations to include the Hanssen case, and because of that experience, SA Gessford was uniquely situated to assist the FBI and CHS in protecting the information being discussed).

The CHS was then given a general overview of the FBI's CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation and told that it was a small cell that was exploring a small piece of the overall problem of Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS was advised that the CH team was made aware of TYPHOON's' May 2016 comments in the U.K. in late July by a friendly foreign service and that TYPHOON had predicated a small analytical effort that eventually expanded to include FURY, RAZOR, and DRAGON. CHS advised that he was not aware of TYPHOON.

The CHS was sensitized to the fact that the FBI was particularly interested in additional information on FURY and DRAGON as well as any additional information that could be developed on others as yet unknown. CHS was sensitized that the FBI was specifically interested in additional information on DRAGON, as it was assessed that DRAGON is the most vulnerable to an approach by the FBI and any information gathered by the CHS would be scrutinized by the FBI for use in a possible future approach/interview by the FBI of DRAGON. Going forward, the CHS was advised that the FBI was interested in three "buckets":

1. Additional intelligence/reporting on specific, named individuals (such as DRAGON or FURY) involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship;



2. Physical evidence of specific individuals involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship (such as emails, photos, ledgers, memorandums etc);

3. Any individuals or sub sources who the CHS could identify who could serve as cooperating witnesses to assist in identifying persons involved in the Trump campaign-Russian relationship.

In regards to the three “buckets” mentioned above, and with the FBI’s future relationship with the CHS in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE matter, the CHS was advised that the FBI was willing to compensate the CHS significantly (the CHS was told that it was routine for the FBI to pay upwards of a million dollars to sources who provide information to the FBI regarding penetrations of the USG/USIC which lead to judicial action), and the CHS was admonished that if the CHS and FBI were going to have a reporting relationship regarding specific items of interest to the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE team (i.e. FURY and DRAGON), that the CHS must have an exclusive reporting relationship with the FBI, rather than providing that information to the clients that hired the CHS’s firm to provide reporting on Trump and FURY.

Going forward, CHS will remain in contact with ALAT Gaeta for future handling and contact, with the understanding that SA Gessford or others on the CH team may also meet with CHS. CHS was advised that he will be paid \$15,000 USD for his time and efforts for the meeting in Rome.

CHS will consider future ways to assist the FBI (SA Note: It appeared that the CHS intended to come to the meeting prepared to generally discuss his operations and continue to provide the FBI with general, background information regarding Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS appeared to be caught off guard with the specific tasking that he received, and it remains to be seen if the CHS can provide specific intelligence to the FBI in response to the tasking).

CHS advised that he is personal friends with Ivanka Trump and that the USIC may see some email traffic in that regard. CHS advised that Ivanka is very smart and that CHS can’t see her involved with this matter.

Lastly, CHS advised that CHS had provided Trump Campaign information to a member of the U.S. State Department (who was a personal friend/long term contact) in an effort to ensure that the information was reaching the proper elements of the USG. CHS was advised to stand down on taking those types of action and to only provide the information to the FBI through ALAT Gaeta and the CH team.

Investigation continues.

Ben

[REDACTED]

=====

[REDACTED]

=====

[REDACTED]

=====



[REDACTED]

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**Electronic Communication**

**Title:** (U/[REDACTED]) CHS [REDACTED] STEELE Reporting received between July 5 and September 20, 2016.

**Date:** 09/30/2016

**CC:** Benjamin E. Gessford  
Joe Pientka III

**From:** ROME

**Contact:** GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH, [REDACTED]

**Approved By:** RAMSEY KIERAN L

**Drafted By:** GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH

**Case ID #:** 97F-HQ-2063661-NY [REDACTED] CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;  
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -  
RUSSIA;  
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

**Synopsis:** (U/[REDACTED]) CHS [REDACTED] STEELE Reporting received between July 5 and September 20, 2016 being sent to the instant file.

[REDACTED]

**Enclosure (s):** Enclosed are the following items:

- 1. (U/[REDACTED]) CHS report received July 5, 2016
- 2. (U/[REDACTED]) 4 CHS reports received Aug 29, 16
- 3. (U/[REDACTED]) 1 CHS Report received July 25, 16
- 4. (U/[REDACTED]) 1 CHS Report received September 20, 2016

**Details:**

On July 5, 2016, ALAT Gaeta met with CHS [REDACTED] STEELE. CHS advised that CHS had been contracted by GLENN SIMPSON, on behalf of an unnamed Washington D.C. based law firm, to develop and provide information regarding Donald Trump's connections to, and relationships within,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: (U/[REDACTED]) CHS [REDACTED] STEELE Reporting received between July 5 and September 20, 2016.

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 09/30/2016

Russia. CHS has obtained information, as described fully in the attached seven reports, detailing these relationships and activities. CHS provided these reports to ALAT Gaeta independently and without tasking. CHS advised that similar information from different sources unrelated to the CHS, may already be in the hands of those at a "high level" in Washington D.C.

The attached reports are in the original form as prepared by the CHS and given to the client, SIMPSON. The handwritten dates on the face of each report are the dates that they were received by the handling by ALAT Gaeta. Between July 5 and September 20, 2016, ALAT Gaeta spoke with [REDACTED] (FBINY), [REDACTED] (FBINY), ASAC [REDACTED] (FBINY) and SSA Joe Pientka (FBIHQ) regarding the dissemination of the attached information. As such, it was determined that the attached reporting will be submitted to the instant file.

◆◆

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**Electronic Communication**

**Title:** [REDACTED] Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on **Date:** 11/14/2016  
October 3, 2016

**From:** CLEVELAND

**Contact:** Benjamin E. Gessford, [REDACTED]

**Approved By:** Joe Pientka III

**Drafted By:** Benjamin E. Gessford

**Case ID #:** 97F-HQ-2063661-NY [REDACTED] CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;  
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -  
RUSSIA;  
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

**Synopsis:** [REDACTED] To document outside of Delta a meeting held with FBI  
CHS CROWN in Rome, Italy, on October 3, 2016

**Reason:** [REDACTED]

**Derived From:** [REDACTED]

**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]

**Details:**

[REDACTED] The purpose of this EC is to document, for the record, a meeting held between SA Ben Gessford, SIA Brian Auten, A/Section Chief Mike Varacalli, and Rome ALAT Mike Gaeta with FBI CHS CROWN in Rome, Italy on October 3, 2016. The objective of the meeting was for ALAT Gaeta to introduce CROWN to members of the FBI CROSSFIRE HURRICANE (CH) Team and to assess if CROWN was in possession of additional pertinent information and was willing to enter into an exclusive reporting relationship with the FBI.

[REDACTED] The meeting occurred on October 3, 2016, offsite of the U.S. Embassy, from approx 1500 to 1800. CHS had previously met with ALAT Gaeta prior on the same day (approx 1400) to meeting with Gessford, Varacelli, and Auten. After the intial meeting, ALAT advised that CHS

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on October 3, 2016  
Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/14/2016

volunteered his reporting relationship with the U.S. State Department. Upon initial introductions, ALAT Gaeta remained in the CH meeting.

[REDACTED] CHS was introduced to the CH team and advised that his business partner was unable to attend the meeting. CHS is a FGI [REDACTED] [REDACTED] CHS advised that he runs a small, business/financial intelligence firm in London with his partner and a small number of staff. CHS advised that he uses an "agent handler" (SA Note: CHS continually referred to one handler, and upon further questioning, implied that he had several, but it appeared that he has one primary handler who he continually referred to in this matter) who travels into Russia and interacts with a number of subsources (who are not witting) to gather his intelligence. He has a number of unnamed "clients" who he provides intelligence reports to and if he determines that there is information of interest to the USG, he provides duplicate copies of those reports to ALAT Gaeta for distribution and consumption within the FBI.

[REDACTED] CHS continually made reference to the importance of confidentiality with his clients and subsources but advised that he knows of the importance of the information that predicated the meeting. CHS advised that his primary agent handler was currently inside Russia and that he would debrief him upon his return on Sunday, October 8, 2016. CHS mentioned that he was becoming increasingly fearful for the safety of his agent handler in Russia as he believed that his Russian sub sources are becoming increasingly reluctant to discuss the Trump-Russian relationship and this is increasingly becoming a closed topic for discussion. CHS also mentioned that it was very dangerous to identify his sub source network by name, as it was well known that the USIC and "your agency" (the FBI) have had problems in the past with internal penetrations (CHS was advised that SA Gessford was very well versed with internal penetrations to include the Hanssen case, and because of that experience, SA Gessford was uniquely situated to assist the FBI and CHS in protecting the information being discussed).

[REDACTED] The CHS was then given a general overview of the FBI's

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on October 3, 2016  
Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/14/2016

CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation and told that it was a small cell that was exploring a small piece of the overall problem of Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS was advised that the CH team was made aware of CROSSFIRE TYPHOON's' May 2016 comments in the U.K. in late July by a friendly foreign service and that TYPHOON had predicated a small analytical effort that eventually expanded to include CROSSFIRE FURY, CROSSFIRE RAZOR, and CROSSFIRE DRAGON. CHS advised that he was not aware of TYPHOON.

[REDACTED] The CHS was sensitized to the fact that the FBI was particularly interested in additional information on FURY and DRAGON as well as any additional information that could be developed on others as yet unknown. CHS was sensitized that the FBI was specifically interested in additional information on DRAGON, as it was assessed that DRAGON is the most vulnerable to an approach by the FBI and any information gathered by the CHS would be scrutinized by the FBI for use in a possible future approach/interview by the FBI of DRAGON.

[REDACTED] Going forward, the CHS was advised that the FBI was interested in three "buckets":

1. Additional intelligence/reporting on specific, named individuals (such as DRAGON or FURY) involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship;
2. Physical evidence of specific individuals involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship (such as emails, photos, ledgers, memorandums etc);
3. Any individuals or sub-sources who the CHS could identify who could serve as cooperating witnesses to assist in identifying persons involved in the Trump campaign-Russian relationship.

[REDACTED] In regards to the three "buckets" mentioned above, and with the FBI's future relationship with the CHS in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE matter, the CHS was advised that the FBI was willing to compensate the CHS significantly (the CHS was told that it was routine for the FBI to pay upwards of a million dollars to sources who provide information to the FBI regarding penetrations of the USG/USIC which lead to judicial

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on October 3, 2016  
Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/14/2016

action), and the CHS was admonished that if the CHS and FBI were going to have a reporting relationship regarding specific items of interest to the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE team (i.e. FURY and DRAGON), that the CHS must have an exclusive reporting relationship with the FBI, rather than providing that information to the clients that hired the CHS's firm to provide reporting on Trump and FURY.

[REDACTED] Going forward, CHS will remain in contact with ALAT Gaeta for future handling and contact, with the understanding that SA Gessford or others on the CH team may also meet with CHS. CHS was advised that he will be paid \$15,000 USD for his time and efforts for the meeting in Rome.

[REDACTED] CHS will consider future ways to assist the FBI (SA Note: It appeared that the CHS intended to come to the meeting prepared to generally discuss his operations and continue to provide the FBI with general, background information regarding Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS appeared to be caught off guard with the specific tasking that he received, and it remains to be seen if the CHS can provide specific intelligence to the FBI in response to the tasking).

[REDACTED] CHS advised that he is personal friends with Ivanka Trump and that the USIC may see some email traffic in that regard. CHS advised that Ivanka is very smart and that CHS can't see her involved with this matter.

[REDACTED] Lastly, CHS advised that CHS had provided Trump Campaign information to a member of the U.S. State Department (who was a personal friend/long term contact) in an effort to ensure that the information was reaching the proper elements of the USG. CHS was advised to stand down on taking those types of action and to only provide the information to the FBI through ALAT Gaeta and the CH team.

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on October 3, 2016  
Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/14/2016

◆◆

[REDACTED]

8/12/16

(Date)

VA  
(Location)

I, Mitch, authorize  
(Name)

Special Agents Benjamin E Gressford and Stephen M Sommer

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, to utilize the following

(initial all that apply):

M Body Recorder, microphone, or other recording device on or in the vicinity of my person;

M Transmitter on or in the vicinity of my person;

h Recording device or other equipment to capture and record telephone communications, including conversations (voice), text messages, e-mails, Internet, or other communications made or received over any telephone used by me;

M Utilize Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) or other video equipment located at

\_\_\_\_\_ to view  
(List address, Name/Location of Hotel, or Description of vehicle etc., or state "on consenting party")

Residence 5th room / P 110  
(If not "on consenting party," describe area to be viewed (i.e. residence kitchen area, restaurant rear table etc.))

and/or

M Other (Specify): \_\_\_\_\_  
(Note "Other" category may not be used to document consent for the monitoring of computer electronic communications. For consent/authorization to monitor computer communications, including the communications of a computer trespasser, refer to the FD-1070 and/or FD-1071, as appropriate.)

for the purpose of monitoring, viewing, listening to, and/or recording any activity I may have with

Crossfire Dragon and others as yet unknown  
(Name of Subject(s))

which I may have on or about 8/12/16 and continuing thereafter until such a time as  
(Date)

either I revoke my permission or the FBI terminates the investigation.

I understand that I must be a party to any communication in order to record or monitor that communication. I therefore agree not to leave the recording or monitoring equipment unattended or take any action which is likely to result in the recording or monitoring of communications to which I am not a party.

AND/OR



\_\_\_\_\_ Install a Pen Register and/or Trap and Trace device in conjunction with the appropriate provider(s) of electronic or wire communications service and/or long distance carrier for the purpose of identifying telephone numbers calling and being called by telephone number \_\_\_\_\_ located at/subscribed to by \_\_\_\_\_ which is used by me.  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Address)

I have given this written permission to the above-named Special Agents voluntarily, and without threats or promises of any kind.

Mitch  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

Witnesses:  


Privacy Act Statement: Any information collected from you on this form, along with any other device provided to you for use on your person, vehicle, or other object, or for use at the designated location listed on this form, will collect information about you, as authorized by law, and will be used to support FBI activities. Your consent to providing information on this form and to the subsequent collection of information in the manner outlined on this form is voluntary. This information is maintained in the system of records FBI-002, FBI Central Records System, and may be disclosed in accordance with published routine uses for the system. The text of FBI-002 and its routine uses may be found on the FBI internet site at <http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-act/systems-records>



FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT
----------	---

**HEADER**

Source ID: **HALPER**  
 Date: 06/17/2016  
 Case Agent Name: **Non SES**  
 Field Office/Division: New York  
 Squad: CD 8  
 Classified By: **[REDACTED]**  
 Derived From: **[REDACTED]**  
 Declassify On: **[REDACTED]**

**PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT**

From: 03/03/2016  
 To: 06/01/2016

**OPENING/REOPENING**

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached? Yes

Date of Record Checks
04/15/2016

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated? Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening? Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: 02/01/2012

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?) Yes

**SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES**

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)? No

**SENSITIVE CATEGORIES**

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category? No

**SECTION I CERTIFICATION**

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 06/01/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

**OPERATIONAL MATTERS**



**TAB 3**

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> SOURCE CLOSING COMMUNICATION
----------	--

**HEADER**

**Source ID:** STEELE [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 11/17/2016  
**Case Agent Name:** Gaeta, Michael J  
**Field Office/Division:** International Operations  
**Squad:** Legat Rome

**DETAILS**

*CHS is being closed. After serializing this Source Closing Communication, only the Confidential File Room personnel may access or grant access to this Source Site.*

**Was the source closed for cause?** No

*Note: Cause is defined as any grievous action by, or set of previously unknown facts/circumstances, that deem the individual not suitable for use as a CHS.*

*Closing for Cause is based on the facts and circumstances as determined on a case-by-case basis. Closing for Cause is a decision based on the seriousness of the violation. The following are possible reasons which may justify Closing for Cause: Unauthorized Criminal Activity, Serious control problems, Unreliable, and Violated instructions.*

**General Reason for Closing:** Confidentiality revealed

**Provide additional details:**

CHS confirmed to an outside third party that CHS has a confidential relationship with the FBI. CHS was used as a source for an online article. In the article, CHS revealed CHS' relationship with the FBI as well as information that CHS obtained and provided to FBI. On November 1, 2016, CHS confirmed all of this to the handling agent. At that time, handling agent advised CHS that the nature of the relationship between the FBI and CHS would change completely and that it was unlikely that the FBI would continue a relationship with the CHS. Additionally, handling agent advised that CHS was not to operate to obtain any intelligence whatsoever on behalf of the FBI. Thereafter, handling agent was advised by FBI CI/CD and FBI IOD EM not to contact the CHS.

For note, the aggregate amount listed is incorrect. As noted in the file, the CHS has been paid \$95,000 to date since opening.

**Would you recommend the CHS for reopening?** Yes

**On:** 11/01/2016  
**the CHS:** was notified of deactivation.  
**FBI SA:** Mike Gaeta  
**Other Government Witness:** NA

**CHS Response:** acknowledged receipt and understanding of the notice to close.

**Is an FPO attorney participating in the conduct of an investigation utilizing this CHS or is the FPO working with this CHS in connection with the prosecution of a case?** No

**Has the case agent or co-case agent determined that there is sufficient reason to close a CHS, however, immediate notification to the CHS would jeopardize an ongoing investigation, prosecution, or cause a flight from prosecution?** No

*Note: Absent exceptional circumstances that are approved by an SSA, in advance if possible, an FBI Agent shall not initiate contact with, or respond to contacts from, a former CHS who has been closed for cause. Such approval must be documented in the CHS's main file. Further, if approved, such contact must be coordinated, in advance if possible, with any FPO participating in the conduct of an investigation that will utilize that CHS or in which that CHS will be expected to testify.*

**Was the captioned individual authorized to engage in OIA?** No

**Is the CHS an undocumented alien?** No

FD-1040a	Page 1 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	<b>FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION</b> SOURCE CLOSING COMMUNICATION
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Have all CHS payment issues been addressed and completed? Yes

Total Paid Amount: \$74,000.00

Was the individual ever publicly acknowledged by the FBI? No

Was the individual aware of his/her status as a CHS? Yes

*Ensure that all other necessary forms on this source site have been serialized before serializing this Source Closing Communication. After serializing this form, only the CHSC and CFR personnel may access or grant access to this Source Site.*

**SIGNATURE**

Submitted By	mjgaeta (Michael Gaeta)	Thu, 17 Nov 2016 17:19:38 +0100
First Level Approved By	[REDACTED]	Thu, 17 Nov 2016 17:37:24 +0100

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]