

Additional Background:

- There is significant demand from state and local election officials for CISA's continued support to their efforts to address foreign influence operations and disinformation. According to an [April 2023 Survey of Local Election Officials by the Brennan Center for Justice](#), 85% of local election officials feel that it is beneficial "for CISA to dispel false information about elections by promoting accurate information on election administration and technology."
- Notably, the [2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community](#) highlights the continued threat of foreign influence operations: "Moscow views U.S. elections as opportunities for malign influence as part of its larger foreign policy strategy. Moscow has conducted influence operations against U.S. elections for decades, including as recently as the U.S. midterm elections in 2022."
- The Cybersecurity Advisory Committee (CSAC) and its subcommittees are comprised of non-Federal experts who convene to consider, deliberate on, and ultimately deliver non-binding advice and recommendations to Agency leadership. CSAC reports, including associated recommendations, are not Federal policy and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Government. The Committee's recommendations and, importantly, CISA's response to those recommendations are [posted publicly](#).
- DHS's approved scope of work for the cooperative agreement with the Center for Internet Security (CIS) never funded CIS to perform any disinformation-related work. While CIS proposed that DHS fund its work to identify and report disinformation for the 2022 election cycle, DHS declined to do so. To the extent that CIS, the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), or the Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC) reported potential disinformation to social media platforms in relation to the 2022 election cycle, CISA was not involved.
- CISA's work during the 2018 and 2020 election cycles to connect election stakeholders to social media platforms has always been non-partisan. This work involved forwarding reporting from election officials of both parties, non-partisan election administrators, election vendors, and political parties to the relevant platforms. Online content platform operators, as always, made their own decisions regarding the content on their platforms.
- The genesis of CISA's disinformation-related work began with bipartisan support and oversight during the previous Administration, was coordinated broadly with the interagency, and was briefed extensively to Congress and the White House.
- CISA has conducted its work in plain view, operating with the highest degree of transparency. Our guidance products are [posted publicly](#) on our website or shared directly with election stakeholders. As part of a recent complete overhaul of our CISA.gov website, including updates to over a thousand webpages, we clarified language describing CISA's work on foreign influence operations and disinformation related to election infrastructure security.